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DEATH-DEFYING FEATS:
STATE CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES TO
NEW YORK'S DEATH PENALTY
Mary R. Falk* & Eve Cary**
While this court has the power to correct constitutional or
other errors retroactively by ordering new trials for capital
defendants whose appeals are pending or who have been
fortunate enough to obtain stays of execution or commu-
tations, it cannot of course, raise the dead'
It is the Supreme Courts function to define the limits of
what states can do, not what they should do. Focusing on
the outer limits of state power averts attention from the
inner question: What is the proper exercise of criminal
procedure? The real question for us is not what the State
can do, but rather what we should do .
INTRODUCTION
What follows is an essay in several senses: "an experiment," "a
rehearsal," "a first tentative attempt at learning."3 It is not a
. Associate Professor of Legal Writing, Brooklyn Law School. New York
University School of Law, J.D.; Sarah Lawrence College, B.A. The research and
writing of this article were supported by grants from the summer stipend
program of Brooklyn Law School. Thanks are also due to Marcia Tavares Maack
for her help with research and to Elizabeth Antoine and Rose Patti for their
always invaluable help.
*. Associate Professor of Legal Writing, Brooklyn Law School. New York
University School of Law, J.D.; Sarah Lawrence College, B.A.
Suffolk Dist. Attorney v. Watson, 411 N.E.2d 1274, 1282 (Mass. 1980),
superseded by statute as stated in Commonwealth v. Colon-Cruz, 470 N.E.2d
116 (Mass. 1984).
2 State v. Ramseur, 524 A.2d 188, 295 (N.J. 1987) (O'Hern, J., concurring).
3 NEW SHORTER OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 851 (4th ed. 1993).
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traditional law review article, in that it does not present a com-
pleted body of research and conclusions drawn from it; rather, this
is ultimately a call for research.
From the moment it began to seem that New York again would
have capital punishment legislation, it was clear to any prosecutor
or member of the criminal defense bar-given the United States
Supreme Court's "deregulation ' 4 of capital punishment-that only
the New York State Constitution, and thus our court of appeals,
stood between us and the death penalty. Would the court of appeals
strike down the new statute as per se unconstitutional? Or would
it find that specific provisions violated the state constitution?
Surely, constructing arguments and counter-arguments, perhaps
even predicting the court's conclusions, could not be all that
difficult. Surely, it should be possible to measure the new law
against what we know of the court's state constitutional juris-
prudence and reach reasoned conclusions, analogizing to the
decisions of other state courts presented with similar issues.
But educated guessing-let alone guessing correctly-is almost
impossible here, rather like being asked to speak a language that
has not yet been invented.5 This is so first of all because, as the
4 Since the early 1980s, the Supreme Court has regularly rejected challenges
by death row inmates. See, e.g., Callins v. Collins, 114 S. Ct. 1127 (1994)
(allowing the states great freedom in death penalty matters).
The term "deregulation" was coined by Robert Weisberg. See Robert
Weisberg, Deregulating Death, 1983 SuP. CT. REv. 305 (1983).
' The least fruitful research tool here is the grapevine-knowing the judges'
personal convictions about the death penalty would be of little use. One of the
most powerful expressions of personal abhorrence of the death penalty is
contained in then-Chief Judge Charles Breitel's dissent from a decision striking
down New York's former death penalty. In People v. Davis, Judge Breitel wrote:
I find capital punishment repulsive, unproven to be an effective
deterrent .. . unworthy of a civilized society (except perhaps for
deserters in time of war) because of the occasion of mistakes and
changes in social values as to what are mitigating circumstances, and
the brutalizing of all those who participate directly or indirectly in its
infliction.
43 N.Y.2d 17, 39, 371 N.E.2d 456, 468, 400 N.Y.S.2d 735, 747-48 (1977). More
recently, in a law review article Judge Joseph Bellacosa expressed misgivings
about the death penalty, but he warned readers to draw no conclusions about his
position. See Joseph W. Bellacosa, Ethical Impulses from the Death Penalty:
CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES
Supreme Court has recognized, death is "different" from all other
punishments. 6 It is, therefore, not possible to analogize capital
punishment issues to any other area of the law. Further, it is
unclear what method of state constitutional adjudication the court
of appeals will use.7 And no matter what method the court adopts,
the resolution of many death penalty issues requires reliance on
highly specialized research, much of it empirical and non-tradi-
tional, and most of it yet to be undertaken. Finally, the experience
of other states is not very useful because of textual differences in
state constitutions and capital punishment statutes, and because so
many death penalty issues turn on evidence that is not only
empirical, but local as well.
All we can do here is to try to see what general shape some
death penalty issues might take in New York courts. To that end,
in part I we provide a brief summary of the capital punishment
jurisprudence of the United States Supreme Court; in part II we
detail the history and methodology of state constitutional adjudica-
tion; and in part III we examine constitutional challenges to the
death penalty in other states. In part IV, we then analyze just a few
of the challenges we believe likely to come before the New York
Court of Appeals, and we identify areas where further research is
needed.
We reach just one practical conclusion, which is that potential
challenges are numberless, a vast empty space on the map. The
challenges we anticipate in this essay-per se and facial challenges
to the statute-may account for only a small part of the challenges
eventually raised. Several factors conjoin to multiply the issues.
First, the door to the federal courts is all but closed and the reach
of the state constitution unknown.8 Second, capital prosecutions are
procedurally complex and the opportunities for error are endless.
The Supreme Court's paradoxical requirement that capital
"Old Sparky's" Jolt to the Legal Profession, 14 PACE L. REv. 1, 2 (1994).
6 See, e.g., Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 357 (1977). The penalty of
death is different, of course, because it is "severe beyond rectification." Ramseur,
524 A.2d at 303 (Handler, J., dissenting).
See infra part II.
See James R. Acker & Elizabeth A. Walsh, Challenging the Death Penalty
Under State Constitutions, 42 VAND. L. REv. 1299, 1301 (1989).
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prosecutions be at once consistent and individualized is in itself a
bottomless pit of potential error. And finally, because death is
fundamentally different from all other sentences, any issue that can
be colorably framed in state constitutional terms will be raised. In
short, litigators and judges-in particular the judges of the court of
appeals-have their work cut out for them.
Finally, in the course of this project we have come to believe
that even people who are not opposed to the death penalty itself
may reasonably conclude that New York's new statute should be
stricken as unconstitutional on two grounds that seem unassailable.
First, imposition of the death penalty under the new statute appears
plainly to violate both the federal and state constitutions because
the statute permits defendants to escape the risk of a death sentence
by pleading guilty to capital murder as charged.9 This provision
improperly burdens the right to a jury trial and the guarantee
against compelled self-incrimination by effectively making their
exercise punishable by death.' °
Second, anyone who becomes fully familiar with death penalty
jurisprudence is likely to come to agree with Justice Alan Handler
of the New Jersey Supreme Court that the death penalty eventually
reveals itself to be unconstitutional in practice, even if we begin by
believing it to be constitutional in principle." This is so because
it is not humanly possible to devise procedures for its fair
imposition-procedures that adequately take into account the
stunning "moral fact"' 2 that death is different from all other
punishments.
9 Death Penalty-Imposition and Procedures-Assignment of Counsel
[hereinafter Death Penalty Act] § 10, 1995 N.Y. LAWS 1, 4 (amending N.Y.
CRIM. PROC. LAW § 220.10(5)(e) (McKinney 1993)); Death Penalty Act § 11,
1995 N.Y. LAWS at 4 (amending N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 220.30(3)(b)(vii)
(McKinney 1993)).
'0 United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570, 583 (1968). See infra part IV.B.1.
" See, e.g., State v. Bey, 645 A.2d 685, 732 (N.J. 1994) (Handler, J.,
dissenting); State v. Ramseur, 524 A.2d 188, 373 (N.J. 1987) (Handler, J.,
dissenting).
12 Bey, 645 A.2d at 731-32 (Handler, J., dissenting).
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I. THE DEATH PENALTY AND THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION
To understand the importance of the role of state constitutions
in the area of capital punishment, a brief overview of the Supreme
Court's pronouncements on the Federal Constitution's applicability
to the death penalty is necessary. The starting point is Furman v
Georgia3 which was decided in 1972. While Furman was not the
decision that opponents of the death penalty had hoped for, because
the Court did not find capital punishment a per se violation of the
Constitution, it did have the effect of striking down the death
penalty statutes of thirty-nine states and various federal statutory
provisions, as well as vacating the death sentences of over six
hundred condemned prisoners. 4 The Court announced its decision
in a brief, per curiam opinion, holding simply that "the imposition
and carrying out of the death penalty in [the cases before the
Court] constituted cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments."' 5 All nine Justices wrote
separate opinions. Justices William Douglas, William Brennan,
Potter Stewart, Byron White and Thurgood Marshall concurred;
Chief Justice Warren Burger and Justices Harry Blackmun, Lewis
Powell and William Rehnquist dissented. 6
While only Justices Brennan and Marshall found the death
penalty to be per se unconstitutional, all of the concurring Justices
agreed that the death penalty as applied under the challenged
statutes violated the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments because
"[]uries (or judges, as the case may be) [had] practically untram-
meled discretion to let an accused live or insist that he die,"17 and
'3 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
Id. at 417 (Powell, J., dissenting).
'5 Id. at 239-40.
6 Justices Lewis Powell and Harry Blackmun subsequently changed their
minds. Justice Powell has "come to think that capital punishment should be
abolished." John C. Jeffries, Jr., A Change of Mind That Came Too Late, N.Y.
TIMEs, June 23, 1994, at Al. Justice Blackmun recently wrote that he felt
"morally and intellectually obligated simply to concede that the death penalty
experiment has failed." Callins v. Collins, 114 S. Ct. 1127, 1130 (1994)
(Blackmun, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari).
"7 Furman, 408 U.S. at 248 (Douglas, J., concurring).
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because there was no meaningful basis for distinguishing the few
cases in which the death penalty was imposed from the many cases
in which it was not.'8 They concurred in Justice White's con-
clusion that "the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments cannot
tolerate the infliction of a sentence of death under legal systems
that permit this unique penalty to be so wantonly and so freakishly
imposed."' 9
Thus, the opinion in Furman established the principle that, in
order for a capital punishment statute to be constitutional, it must
at least insure both that the death penalty is imposed consistently
and that it is individualized. Consistency is achieved by the
narrowing of the class of cases in which death may be imposed;
individualization is achieved by legislatively guiding the sentencing
authority in selecting the persons within the class on whom the
death penalty should be imposed.
Although many were hopeful that Furman would effectively
end capital punishment in the United States, a number of state
legislatures reacted to the decision by attempting to draft statutes
that would avoid the arbitrariness in the imposition of the death
penalty that the Supreme Court had condemned.2" One of the first
post-Furman statutes to reach the Supreme Court was Georgia's.2'
In Gregg v Georgia,22 the Supreme Court finally rejected the
argument first raised in Furman that contemporary standards of
decency had evolved to a point where capital punishment could no
longer be tolerated.23 On the contrary, the Court said, "the
punishment of death does not invariably violate the Constitution" 24
and is "not a form of punishment that may never be imposed,
regardless of the circumstances of the offense, regardless of the
"' Id. at 248 (Douglas, J., concurring).
'9 id. at 310 (White, J., concurring).
20 See John W. Poulos, The Supreme Court, Capital Punishment and the
Substantive Criminal Law: The Rise and Fall of Mandatory Capital Punishment,
28 ARIZ. L. REV. 143, 145 (1986).
21 GA. CODE ANN. §§ 17-10-30 to -10-35 (1990).
22 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
23 Id. at 173.
24 Id. at 169.
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character of the offender, and regardless of the procedure followed
in reaching the decision to impose it."
25
The Court then went on to examine the procedures necessary to
avoid the arbitrariness in the imposition of the death penalty that
was condemned in Furman. Furman, the Court said, "mandates that
where discretion is afforded a sentencing body on a matter so grave
as the determination of whether a human life should be taken or
spared, that discretion must be suitably directed and limited so as
to minimize the risk of wholly arbitrary and capricious action. 26
An "indispensable prerequisite to a reasoned determination of
whether a defendant shall live or die '"27 is accurate sentencing
information concerning the circumstances of the offense and the
character and propensities of the offender.28 While jury sentencing
is desirable in capital cases in order "to maintain a link between
contemporary community values and the penal system ' '2 it also
creates a problem because "[m]uch of the information that is
relevant to the sentencing decision may have no relevance to the
question of guilt . . .[and indeed] may even be extremely preju-
dicial to a fair determination of that question."3
Thus, the Court suggested that "a bifurcated procedure ... in
which the question of sentence is not considered until the deter-
mination of guilt has been made is the best answer."'" Moreover,
because "members of a jury will have had little, if any, experience
in sentencing, they are unlikely to be skilled in dealing with the
[sentencing] information [that] they are given. 32 Therefore, to
avoid arbitrariness, the jury must also be given "guidance regarding
the factors about the crime and the defendant that the state,
25 Id. at 187.
26 Id. at 189.
27 Id. at 190.
28 Id. at 189 (citing Pennsylvania ex rel. Sullivan v. Ashe, 302 U.S. 51, 55
(1937)).
29 Id. at 190 (citing Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 519 n.15 (1968)).
30 Id.
31 Id. at 190-91.
32 Id. at 192.
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representing organized society, deems particularly relevant to the
sentencing decision."33
Having outlined these principles, the Supreme Court went on to
hold constitutional Georgia's new statute, which narrowed the class
of murderers subject to capital punishment by specifying ten
statutory aggravating circumstances, one of which the jury had to
find to exist before capital punishment could be imposed.3 4 The
statute met Furman's concerns, the Court said, because it focused
the jury's attention on
the particularized nature of the crime and the particularized
characteristics of the individual defendant. While the jury
is permitted to consider any aggravating or mitigating
circumstances, it must find and identify at least one
statutory aggravating factor before it may impose a penalty
of death. In this way, the jury's discretion is channeled. No
longer can a jury wantonly and freakishly impose the death
sentence; it is always circumscribed by legislative guide-
lines.35
In addition, the Court noted, the statute provided for the automatic
appeal of any death sentence to the Georgia Supreme Court, which
would insure against arbitrariness in capital sentencing.36
On the same day the Supreme Court issued its decision in
Gregg, it upheld the new Texas37 and Florida3" death penalty
statutes, which like Georgia's, provided procedural safeguards
against arbitrariness. It also struck down capital punishment statutes
in Louisiana39 and North Carolina,4° however, because both
states had responded to Furman by passing statutes that provided
mandatory death penalties for defendants convicted of first degree
33 Id.
34 Id. at 206-07.
35 Id.
36 Id. at 198.
31 See Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, order vacatedby Gregg v. Georgia, 429
U.S. 875 (1976).
31 See Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242, order vacated by Gregg v. Georgia,
429 U.S. 875 (1976).
39 See Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325 (1976).
40 See Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976).
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murder. Mandatory death sentences, the plurality held, were unduly
harsh and rigid and did not allow for "particularized consideration
of relevant aspects of the character and record of each convicted
defendant."'"
A year after the Supreme Court decided Gregg and its com-
panion cases, it decided another important series of cases in which
it held that capital punishment violates the Eighth Amendment
when the punishment is disproportionate to the crime for which it
is imposed. Thus, in Coker v Georgia,42 the Court struck down
the Georgia statute that provided for a death penalty in rape cases
involving an adult woman stating its "abiding conviction that the
death penalty, which is 'unique in its severity and irrevocability
... is an excessive penalty for the rapist who, as such, does not
take a human life., 43 The Court likewise held the death penalty to
be an excessive punishment for the crimes of kidnapping and
robbery where the victim is not killed. Finally, in Enmund v
Florida,44 the Court held that a felony murderer who has not in
fact killed, attempted to kill or intended that a killing take place or
that lethal force be used may not receive a sentence of death.45
Punishment, the Court said, "must be tailored to ... personal
responsibility and moral guilt."46
A recurrent theme running throughout death penalty juris-
prudence is the role that race plays in capital sentencing decisions.
Opponents of the death penalty repeatedly argued that it was
imposed disproportionately on Blacks47 and therefore violated the
Equal Protection Clause.4" For the most part, however, these
" Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 303 (1976).
42 433 U.S. 584 (1977).
41 Id. at 598.
44 458 U.S. 782 (1982).
41 Id. at 798.
46 Id. at 801. Subsequently, in Tison v. Arizona, the Court clarified the
standard for punishment by holding that "major participation in the felony
committed, combined with reckless indifference to human life, is sufficient to
satisfy the Enmund culpability requirement." 481 U.S. 137, 158 (1987).
47 The term "Black" is used throughout this article to encompass a broader
spectrum of minorities than the term "African American" denotes.
48 Symposium on Race and Criminal Justice, 51 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 359
(1994). The Equal Protection Clause states that the state shall not "deny to any
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claims were largely anecdotal. Finally, in 1987, the Supreme Court
squarely faced the issue in McCleskey v Kemp,4 9 a case in which
a highly sophisticated study of two thousand Georgia murder cases
occurring during the 1970s showed that race had infected the
administration of Georgia's capital punishment statute in two ways:
"persons who murder[ed] whites were more likely to be sentenced
to death than persons who murder[ed] blacks, and black murderers
[were] more likely to be sentenced to death than white murder-
ers."
50
The Supreme Court rejected McCleskey's argument that his
sentence violated the Fourteenth Amendment, despite its acceptance
of the statistical evidence showing a discrepancy in the imposition
of the death penalty that appeared to correlate with race.5 The
Court concluded that such apparent discrepancies in sentencing are
"an inevitable part of our criminal justice system. 5 2 McCleskey
had shown no purposeful discrimination in his own case, and the
mere risk that racial prejudice might regularly infect capital
sentencing decisions was "constitutionally acceptable."53
The above discussion outlines the major threshold issues
decided by the Supreme Court in the area of capital punishment.
These cases, however, represent only the tip of the iceberg that
constitutes federal death penalty jurisprudence. Since Furman, the
Supreme Court has decided dozens of cases challenging the
substance and application of most of the post-Furman death penalty
statutes. 
4
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S. CONST.
amend. XIV, § 1.
49 481 U.S. 279 (1987).
5 Id. at 291; see also DAVID C. BALDUS ET AL., EQUAL JUSTICE AND THE
DEATH PENALTY: A LEGAL AND EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 314-15 (1990).
" McClesky, 481 U.S. at 290-92.
52 id. at 312.
13 Id. at 309.
14 Some of the issues that the Court has decided include: whether a state may
execute children, see Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989); Thompson v.
Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815 (1988); whether a constitutional error can be harmless
in a capital case, see Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 181-83 (1986);
whether a defendant who received a life sentence and whose conviction is
reversed on appeal may be resentenced to death after conviction on retrial, see
170
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It is perhaps unsurprising, given the amount of time the
Supreme Court had to spend deciding death penalty cases in the
years after Furman, that at some point it would become concerned
about the degree to which the federal judiciary had become
involved in the overseeing of state criminal courts. Indeed, in 1983,
which has been referred to by one commentator as a "dark year on
Bullingtonv. Missouri, 451 U.S. 430, 438 (1981); whether an insane person may
be executed, see Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 409-10 (1986); whether a
mentally retarded person may be executed, see Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302,
335 (1989); whether the prohibition against double jeopardy prohibits the
reimposition of the death penalty where the original sentence of death was
imposed by error, see Poland v. Arizona, 476 U.S. 147 (1986); Zant v. Stephens,
462 U.S. 862 (1983); whether a person who becomes insane after being
sentenced to death may be restored to sanity against his or her will with anti-
psychotic drugs in order that he or she may be executed, compare Washington
v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 227 (1990) with State v. Perry, 610 So.2d 746, 761
(La. 1992); whether a defendant who pleads guilty in one state in order to avoid
the death penalty can be sentenced to death for the same crime by a different
sovereign, see Heath v. Alabama, 474 U.S. 82, 88 (1985), but see Hunnicutt v.
Oklahoma, 755 P.2d 105, 111 (Okla. Crim. App. 1988); under what circum-
stances a juror's views on capital punishment can be grounds for excluding him
or her from a capital jury and at what stage, see Morgan v. Illinois, 504 U.S.
719, 729 (1992); Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162, 178 (1986); Wainwright v.
Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 424 (1985); Adams v. Texas, 448 U.S. 38, 45 (1980);
Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 519 (1968); whether a statute that
authorizes death as punishment for a crime that is "outrageously or wantonly
vile, horrible or inhuman," Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 422, 428-29
(1980), or "especially heinous, atrocious or cruel," Maynard v. Cartwright, 486
U.S. 356, 361-64 (1988), is too vague to be constitutional; whether the
sentencing authority may rely on either an aggravating or a mitigating factor not
specified in the statute, see Barclayv. Florida, 463 U.S. 939, 949 (1983); Lockett
v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604-05 (1978); whether it is permissible to impose death
where the sole aggravating factor is identical to an element of the crime, see
Lowenfield v. Phelps, 484 U.S. 231, 241-44 (1988); determining the permissible
scope of psychiatric testimony at a sentencing proceeding, see Barefoot v.
Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 899-906 (1983); whether victim impact statements are
permissible at a sentencing proceeding, see Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808,
827 (1991); and whether a sentencing court may rely on undisclosed information
in imposing a death sentence, see Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 358-61
(1977).
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death row,"55 the Court began the process of extricating the
federal judiciary from the administration of capital punishment by
cutting back severely on the use of federal habeas corpus to
challenge the death penalty in cases in which there had been a full
and fair hearing by the state courts on the same issues raised in the
habeas petition. Thus, instead of protecting the rights of capital
defendants to the utmost, the Court began to leave some issues of
the administration of the death penalty up to the states on the
ground that not to do so would be to undermine the autonomy of
state legislatures to enact laws that their citizens wanted.
As a result of the unwillingness of the federal courts to oversee
the administration of the death penalty, the New York Court of
Appeals is now faced with an invitation-or perhaps a
challenge-to decide a wide variety of serious issues as a matter of
New York State constitutional law. It remains to be seen whether
the court will conclude with Justice Harlan that "[t]o identify
before the fact those characteristics of criminal homicides and their
perpetrators which call for the death penalty, and to express these
characteristics in language which can be fairly understood and
applied by the sentencing authority, appear to be tasks which are
beyond present human ability. 5 6
II. STATE CONSTITUTIONAL METHODOLOGY IN THE NEW YORK
COURT OF APPEALS
At the same time that the Supreme Court began to deregulate
the death penalty, it was also cutting back on the expansion of
individual rights generally. In response, litigants, who no longer
found a receptive federal forum in which to raise their claims,
increasingly began to turn to the state courts for vindication of their
rights under their state constitutions. This trend, which became
known as the "New Federalism" movement, is nothing new. In fact,
the New Federalism movement is simply an attempt to regain for
state constitutions the role that they once had as the "primary
" See Richard E. Wirick, Comment, Dark Year on Death Row: Guiding
Sentence Discretion After Zant, Barclay and Harris, 17 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 689
(1984).
56 McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 204 (1971).
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guardian[s]" of individual liberties" in a time of decreasing
federal interest in these rights.
At the time the Federal Bill of Rights was drafted, it applied to
actions of the federal government alone. State constitutions were
the only curbs on the power of state governments. Thus, at this
time, state courts performed a meaningful task if they simply
interpreted state constitutional provisions identically to analogous
provisions of the Federal Constitution. Once the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 8 became available to limit
the power of state governments, however, it became clear that state
constitutions that did no more than mimic the Federal Constitution
would be superfluous. In fact, this is exactly what happened. 9
During the Warren Court years,6" individual rights became
increasingly federalized.6 Litigants chose federal forums and
when they could not-because they were criminal defendants, for
example-they argued federal constitutional claims in state court.
The state courts then interpreted the Federal Constitution, occa-
sionally tacking on a sentence saying that the same result was
compelled by the state constitution as well. At the time of expand-
ing federal rights, no state court ever considered providing broader
rights under the state constitution than were provided under the
Federal Constitution, and no purpose would have been served by
determining that the state constitution provided fewer rights than
the Federal Constitution. Thus, state constitutions became a kind of
vestigial organ, like wisdom teeth.
" Massachusetts v. Upton, 466 U.S. 727, 739 (1984) (Stevens, J.,
concurring).
" The Fourteenth Amendment states, in pertinent part, that "nor shall any
State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
" See Project Report: Toward an Activist Role for State Bills of Rights, 8
HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 271 (1973) [hereinafter Project Report].
60 The period between 1953 and 1969 is considered the "Warren Court
years."
6! Project Report, supra note 59, at 274.
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As the Burger Court62 cut back on individual rights, 3
however, the state court practice of deciding federal before, or in
lieu of, state constitutional claims came under increasing criticism.
Justices Stevens and Brennan were among the critics who favored
a primacy approach to constitutional litigation.' They urged
courts to decide cases under the state constitution in the first
instance. If a court found that a state statute met state constitutional
standards, only then would it decide if the statute met the federally
established minimum standards. If the court struck down the statute
on state constitutional grounds, however, there would be no need
to decide the case under federal law at all.6" The primacy ap-
proach, it was argued, would result in a body of state constitutional
jurisprudence which had been conspicuously lacking.
If the state courts have, as they unquestionably do, the power
to interpret their own state constitutions before considering federal
constitutional claims as yet undecided by the Supreme Court, then
it follows that they are likewise empowered to interpret provisions
in their own state constitutions differently from the manner in
which the Supreme Court has already interpreted identical provi-
sions of the Federal Constitution. It is therefore puzzling that an
intense nationwide debate has emerged-and in New York it is a
particularly intense one---conceming the circumstances under which
a state court may properly decide that a provision in a state
constitution guarantees more protection to individual rights than
does an identical provision of the Federal Constitution already
interpreted by the Supreme Court.
62 The period between 1969 and 1986 is referred to as the "Burger Court
years."
63 See Christopher E. Smith & Thomas R. Hensley, UnfulfilledAspirations:
The Court Packing Efforts of Presidents Reagan and Bush, 57 ALB. L. REv.
1111, 1115 (1994).
64 See Massachusetts v. Upton, 466 U.S. 727, 735-39 (1984) (Stevens, J.,
concurring); William J. Brennan, Jr., Symposium on the Revolution in State
Constitutional Law, 13 VT. L. REv. 11 (1988).
65 In Michigan v. Long, the Supreme Court announced that where a state
court "indicates clearly and expressly that [its decision] is alternatively based on
bonafide separate, adequate and independent grounds," the Court will decline to
review the decision. 463 U.S. 1032, 1041 (1983).
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On one side of this debate are those who argue that our dual
constitutional system permits a state court faced with the task of
deciding an issue already decided by the Supreme Court simply to
construe its own constitution as it deems appropriate, taking into
consideration the "various factors that constitute sound constitu-
tional analysis. ' 66 A state court may turn to the opinions of the
Supreme Court, both majority and dissenting, on the same issue
under the Federal Constitution as sources of wisdom, but not as
precedent entitled to any particular level of deference. In New
York, Chief Judge Judith S. Kaye espouses this methodology.67
On the other side of the debate are those who would reverse the
presumption of state independence, and argue that where the federal
and state constitutions are identical, state courts should adhere to
the federal constitutional interpretation, if one exists, unless some
peculiarity in the history or traditions of the state dictates a
different interpretation. 68  Some of these "non-interpretive
factors"--that is, factors not arising from the wording of the text
itself-include pre-existing state law, matters of particular state or
local concern, state traditions and distinctive public attitudes. 69 In
short, a state court may deviate from the federal constitutional
interpretation only if there is some identifiable characteristic of the
state or its citizens that makes a different interpretation particularly
appropriate. In New York, Judge Joseph Bellacosa is the most
consistent proponent of this method of state constitutional interpre-
tation.
The difference among the judges of the New York Court of
Appeals concerning state constitutional methodology is not unique;
the same debate has persisted for at least a decade in many other
66 State v. Hunt, 450 A.2d 952, 960 (N.J. 1982) (Pashman, J., concurring).
67 See People v. Scott, 79 N.Y.2d 474, 502-06, 593 N.E.2d 1328, 1346-48,
583 N.Y.S.2d 920, 938-40 (1992) (Kaye, C.J., concurring) ("We must of course
be faithful to our precedents,. . . But when we conclude that the Supreme Court
has changed course and diluted constitutional principles, I cannot agree that we
act improperly in discharging our responsibility to support the State
Constitution.").
61 See id at 509, 593 N.E.2d at 1350, 583 N.Y.S.2d at 942 (Bellacosa, J.,
dissenting).
69 Id. at 509-10, 593 N.E.2d at 1350, 583 N.Y.S.2d at 942 (Bellacosa, J.,
dissenting).
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state courts. The question in the New York Court of Appeals is
unusually vexed, however, because the judges appear to disagree
not only about what methodology they should adopt, but also about
what methodology they have adopted in the past. According to
Judge Bellacosa, the court has firmly embraced noninterpretive
analysis and when it abandons that methodology it is "an under-
mining of stare decisis.' ' 70 Judge Kaye, on the other hand, denies
that the court of appeals has ever employed any sort of rigid
method of state constitutional interpretation in deciding whether the
protections of the New York Constitution extend further than those
of the Federal Constitution.7'
In fact, the past cases of the New York Court of Appeals on
this subject are ambiguous. The lawyers who wish to relitigate
capital punishment issues before the court of appeals under the state
constitution will therefore have the daunting task of challenging a
brand new statute in a court that has not entertained a death penalty
case in two decades, a court composed of judges who have never
been faced with such a case and who, moreover, disagree about the
methodology that they will use in reaching their decision. In this
situation, it is clear that the only effective course will be to raise
every available challenge including those that have failed in the
Supreme Court, those that have been effective in other state courts
and those based on New York's peculiar history and attributes.72
III. STATE CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES TO THE DEATH
PENALTY IN OTHER STATES
The first thing to be said about state constitutional challenges
to the death penalty is that they have rarely succeeded.73 If
70 Id. at 513, 593 N.E.2d at 1352, 583 N.Y.S.2d at 944 (Bellacosa, J.,
dissenting).
7" People v. Scott, 79 N.Y.2d 474, 504, 593 N.E.2d 1328, 1347, 583
N.Y.S.2d 920, 939 (1992) (Kaye, C.J., concurring).
72 We argue elsewhere that neither precedent nor principle compels strict
noninterpretive analysis even where federal and state constitutional provisions are
identical. See Eve Cary & Mary R. Falk, People v. Scott and People v. Keta,
Democracy Begins in Conversation, 58 BROOK. L. REv. 1279, 1321-53 (1993).
"' See Acker & Walsh, supra note 8, at 1363 n.151 (listing state supreme
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numbers tell the whole story, there is a long and dusty road ahead
for New York's capital defense bar. Yet whatever the significance
of the win-loss tally, the state constitutional death penalty juris-
prudence of other states offers us only limited substantive guidance.
First, a more than usually sticky web of difference frustrates
analogy and makes many decisions simply inapposite. Together, the
Supreme Court's earlier close scrutiny of capital punishment and its
recent deregulation have resulted in state death penalty statutes with
complex and widely varying provisions. For example, aggravating
and mitigating factors are different and differently framed in
different states, and the burden of proof at sentencing varies from
state to state. Further, the language and substance of state consti-
tutions vary enormously.' For example, some state bills' of rights
conjunctively prohibit "cruel and unusual" punishment,75 like the
Eighth Amendment.76 Some, however, use the disjunctive "cruel
or unusual," 77 prohibit only "cruel" punishments, 78 are silent on
court cases rejecting state constitutional challenges to the death penalty).
" The vast majority of state constitutional challenges to the death penalty
arise, as one would expect, under the various state bills' of rights, and many of
these arise under provisions which, like the Eighth Amendment to the Federal
Constitution, forbid excessive punishment. Others invoke the guarantee of due
process. However, challenges may also arise under other provisions, such as
those mandating a separation of governmental powers. See, e.g., People v. Guest,
503 N.E.2d 255, 272 (I11. 986) (arguing that the prosecutor's decision to seek
the death penalty after the defendant's conviction of a capital crime usurped
judicial power).
" New York's Constitution, for example, states that "[e]xcessive bail shall
not be required nor excessive fines imposed, nor shall cruel and unusual
punishments be inflicted, nor shall witnesses be unreasonably detained." N.Y.
CONST. art. I, § 5.
76 The Eighth Amendment states that "[e]xcessive bail shall not be required,
nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted." U.S.
CONST. amend. VIII.
77 California relied on this disjunctive formulation to conclude that its
Constitution provided greater protection than the Eighth Amendment. People v.
Anderson, 493 P.2d 880, 883 (Cal. 1972). California's Constitution states that
"[c]ruel or unusual punishment may not be inflicted or excessive fines imposed."
CAL. CONST. art. I, § 17.
78 For example, Delaware's parallel constitutional provision provides that
"[e]xcessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel
punishments inflicted. .. ." DEL. CONST. art. I, § 1 1.
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the subject, 79 or use entirely different language to limit punish-
ment.8"
But even decisions construing statutory and constitutional
provisions that are identical to New York's will be of limited
usefulness here, because so many of the most commonly raised and
most troubling death penalty issues involve empirical evidence. For
example, empirical studies are crucial to assessing contemporary
standards of decency," racial justice,82 deterrence," the con-
viction proneness of "death-qualified" juries 4 and attitudes toward
the mentally ill and mentally retarded.85 Indeed, state courts ask
for factual support;86 thus, the single most important lesson New
York practitioners can take from the experience of other states is,
"Do your homework." Where it is available, local data will of
course carry more weight. Moreover, should the New York Court
of Appeals employ noninterpretive analysis, requiring state-specific
reasons to depart from federal precedent, 7 local data will be
dispositive.
There are two other reasons why the experience of other states
is of limited usefulness to New York. First, although citations to
state constitutions abound, there is less inquiry into state
" For example, the Connecticut Constitution has no provision regarding
cruel and unusual punishment.
" For example, Oregon's Constitution provides that "[liaws for the
punishment of crime shall be founded on the principles of reformation, and not
of vindictive justice." OR. CONST. art. 1, § 15.
SI See infra notes 103-13 and accompanying text.
82 See infra notes 120-51 and accompanying text.
8' See infra notes 103-13 and accompanying text.
" "Death qualification" refers generally to the exclusion of potential jurors
opposed to the death penalty from capital trials and sentencing procedures. See
infra part IV.B.2.
8 See infra part IV.B.7.
86 See, e.g., State v. Ramseur, 524 A.2d 188, 252 n.54 (N.J. 1987) (calling
for empirical evidence on the claim that "death qualification" of jurors results in
disproportionate exclusion of women and minorities from capital juries).
87 See supra notes 68-73 and accompanying text. We assume here that
many-though certainly not all-challenges to New York's death penalty will
be raised under the provisions of our state constitution that are textually identical
to the provisions in the Federal Bill of Rights, or very similarly framed, thus
suggesting noninterpretive analysis.
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constitutional meaning and method than one might expect, and
second, much of that inquiry is terse and conclusory 8" The
conjunction of the rise of the New Federalism and the Supreme
Court's deregulation of capital punishment would lead one to
expect, by now, a large and well-developed body of caselaw.
Indeed, the Court's deregulation of the area, premised in part as it
is on deference to the state courts' understanding of local con-
ditions, constitutes an open invitation to build a state constitutional
death penalty jurisprudence-whether on or above the federal
constitutional floor.89
The urgency of the issues and the seeming lack of any
arguments for federal-state uniformity on the death penalty would
further prompt expectations of a substantial caselaw. Yet, there are
" For an excellent survey of state constitutional death penalty decisions
before 1989, see generally, James R. Acker & Elizabeth R. Walsh, supra note 8;
see also HUGO ADAM BEDAU, DEATH is DIFFERENT 186 (1987) (finding the
contributions of state courts to death penalty jurisprudence "slight and erratic").
89 One recent commentator argues that the Supreme Court's deregulation of
capital punishment should be understood not as a retreat from the protection of
individual rights, but rather as a balancing of the enforcement of Eighth
Amendmentnorms against"considerationsof governmental structure, institutional
capacity, and institutional responsibility." Louis D. Bilionis, Legitimating Death,
91 MICH. L. REv. 1643, 1649 (1993). Bilionis argues that:
Precisely because the Court balances, the rules it lays down do not
coextend with the Eighth Amendment's normative content, do not
exhaust the potential of those constitutional values, and do not ensure
a normatively legitimate system of capital punishment ... the problem
is the [Supreme] Court's grasp, not the reach of the underlying norms.
Therein lies the key to unleashing the potential of state constitutional
law. Nature abhors a vacuum, and so too, in its own way, does our
national constitutional environment. State constitutions are a force that
can fill the void, adding a measure of enforcement to constitutional
norms that the Supreme Court, because of its own limitations, cannot
itself provide. Thus conceived, state constitutional law is not a liberal
activist's ploy to evade the Supreme Court's Eighth Amendment
doctrine, but in fact an integral means to complement the federal law.
Id. at 1684-85 (emphasis added) (citations omitted); see also Ramseur, 524 A.2d
at 209. ("Application of state constitutional provisions to these questions is
particularly appropriate in view of the '[c]onsiderations of federalism' that have
constrained the United States Supreme Court in this area.")(citing Gregg v.
Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 186 (1976)).
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no more than several dozen decisions that discuss in any depth the
application of the state constitution to any of the many challenges
(per se and statutory) to the death penalty. Most state constitutional
claims are quickly dismissed, many in de facto lockstep with
federal constitutional interpretation and without analysis.90 These
decisions offer us little substantive or methodological guidance.
The small extent of state constitutional death penalty juris-
prudence and its cryptic nature are surprising, but not unaccounta-
ble. The sheer volume of death penalty issues is undoubtedly a
factor. Moreover, it may well be that practitioners are not making
creative and well-developed arguments and are themselves overly
dependent on federal constitutional analysis. In addition, after years
of domination by federal constitutional law, it is difficult for a state
court to create out of the void a coherent and innovative juris-
prudence, working in a volatile political and legal culture and in an
area that evokes the most passionate and divisive feelings.
Of the several state courts that have engaged in more than state
constitutional lip-service, two stand out for the thoroughness and
thoughtfulness of their death penalty opinions: the New Jersey
Supreme Court, which has upheld the per se constitutionality of the
death penalty and the constitutionality of all but one statutory
provision,9' and the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts,
which sustained both per se and statutory challenges.92
90 As its name suggests, "lockstep" interpretation of state constitutional
provisions simply replicates federal constitutional analysis. See Acker & Walsh,
supra note 8, at 1316.
91 State v. Gerald, 549 A.2d 792 (N.J. 1988) (holding that the state
constitution is violated when the defendant who intended to cause bodily injury,
but not death, is sentenced to death); State v. Ramseur, 524 A.2d 188 (N.J. 1987)
(holding that the death penalty was not per se unconstitutional).
92 Commonwealthv. Colon-Cruz, 470 N.E.2d 116 (Mass. 1984) (invalidating
the death penalty statute on grounds that it impermissibly burdened defendants'
right against self-incrimination and right to a jury trial); Suffolk Dist. Attorney
v. Watson, 411 N.E. 2d 952 (Mass. 1980) (holding the death penalty statute
unconstitutional), superseded by statute as stated in Commonwealth v. Colon-
Cruz, 470 N.E. 116 (1984). The New Jersey Supreme Court most often employs
noninterpretive analysis, while the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts
favors a primacy approach which gives the decisions of the United States
Supreme Court no more weight than any other persuasive precedent. Yet
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Despite the misgivings expressed here, much of the analysis in
the section that follows, identifying potential state constitutional
challenges to New York's death penalty, "relies" on the decisions
of other state courts. Ultimately, of course, such reliance is
antithetical to the notion of state constitutional jurisprudence. Thus,
the issues we catalogue here are just a beginning. The coming years
will call upon New York's criminal defense bar for creativity of the
best and most principled kind.
IV STATE CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES TO NEW YORK'S
DEATH PENALTY
Below, we discuss some of the most likely state constitutional
challenges to New York's death penalty. We discuss per se
challenges first, followed by challenges to the statute. Of course,
per se challenges and challenges to the statute do not nearly
exhaust potential challenges under the New York Constitution.93
As we continue to read and think about the death penalty, the
issues seem to multiply to infinity. For practical reasons alone, we
limit our discussion here to per se challenges and just a few of the
many potential statutory challenges.
A. Per Se Challenges
State constitutional challenges to capital punishment itself have
succeeded just twice, in California94 and in Massachusetts.95
difference in method is not itself dispositive. The most insistent critic of New
Jersey's death penalty statute, Justice Alan Handler, is also the most vocal
proponent of noninterpretive analysis. See, e.g., State v. Hunt, 450 A.2d 952, 957
(N.J. 1982) (Handler, J., concurring).
9' That is to say, there are many potential challenges that are not visible on
the face of the statute. For example, although the United States Supreme Court
has held that the erroneous admission of evidence at the penalty phase of a
bifurcated capital trial can be harmless, the Court itself was not without some
reservations, and the argument will certainly be made in New York that as a
matter of due process, any such error at the penalty phase is reversible error. See
Clemons v. Mississippi, 494 U.S. 738 (1990).
9' People v. Anderson, 493 P.2d 880 (Cal. 1972).
JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY
Although both of those states thereupon amended their constitutions
to permit the imposition of the death penalty,96 per se challenges
should not be dismissed as empty ritual. First, as the authors of a
survey of state constitutional challenges point out, many decisions
on the legitimacy of the death penalty consist of little more than
the recitation of the lockstep credo: the constitution of state "X"
provides no more protection than the Federal Constitution.97
Moreover, some decisions which uphold capital punishment were
made over lengthy and passionate dissents.9" When well-crafted
and well-supported arguments are made to a court committed to
independent state constitutional analysis, the results cannot be a
foregone conclusion.
Nor should the experience of California and Massachusetts be
seen to shut the door on per se challenges. Ironically, it illustrates
one of the major arguments for the New Federalism: state consti-
tutional decisions are more simply and expeditiously subject to
majoritarian review than are the constitutional edicts of the United
States Supreme Court. 99 Finally, times not only change, they keep
9' See Suffolk Dist. Attorney v. Watson, 411 N.E.2d 1274 (Mass. 1980),
superseded by statute as stated in Commonwealth v. Colon-Cruz, 470 N.E.2d
116 (1984).
96 CAL. CONST. art. I, § 27; MASS. CONST. pt. 1, art. 26.
97 See Acker & Walsh, supra note 8, at 1331 n.151.
9 See, e.g., State v. Ross, 646 A.2d 1318, 1373 (Conn. 1994) (Berdon, J.,
dissenting); State v. Ramseur, 524 A.2d 188, 300 (N.J. 1987) (Handler, J.,
dissenting); State v. Dicks, 615 S.W.2d 126, 132 (Tenn. 1981) (Brock, C.J.,
dissenting); Hopkinson v. State, 632 P.2d 79, 172 (Wyo. 1981) (Rose, C.J.,
dissenting); Adams v. State, 271 N.E.2d 425, 431 (Ind. 1971) (DeBruler, J.,
dissenting).
Indeed, Justice Robert Berdon's dissent in Ross suggests that the issue is not
settled in Connecticut. Four justices of the Connecticut Supreme Court
disqualified themselves in Ross. By statute, the chiefjustice may designatejudges
of the Superior Court to sit in such a circumstance. Ross was thus decided by
only three justices of the supreme court-one of whom (Berdon) dissented.
Justice Berdon suggests that upon reconsideration by all seven justices, the death
penalty may well be found to violate the Connecticut Constitution. Ross, 646
A.2d at 1383 (Berdon, J., dissenting).
9 See, e.g., State v. Rupe, 683 P.2d 571, 599 (Wash. 1984) (Dolliver, J.,
concurring) ("[I]t is the duty of this court to express its understanding of the
moral judgments rendered by the people in their constitution. If the people then
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on changing. The capital punishment experiment proceeds in three
dozen states. Subject to empirical evidence, it may well be argued
that the experiment has failed. Two former supporters of the death
penalty on the Supreme Court have already reached this conclu-
sion. 0o
The substantive arguments for and against the death penalty are,
by now, predictable.' Less clear is how practitioners will frame
believe the court is in error, the means to correct that error are available through
the appropriate mechanism to amend our basic document."), cert. denied, 486
U.S. 1061 (1988).
It should also be noted that amending the Massachusetts Constitution was
not the end of the story. The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts
subsequently found that the death penalty statute violated the state constitutional
guarantee of jury trial because it permitted defendants accused of capital crimes
to plead guilty to those offenses, but did not permit the imposition of a death
sentence on such defendants. Commonwealth v. Colon-Cruz, 470 N.E.2d 116,
124 (Mass. 1984). At the writing of this essay, I 1 years after Colon-Cruz, the
Massachusetts Legislature has not passed a new statute and Massachusetts has no
death penalty. See infra part IV.B. 1. (discussing the constitutionality of New
York's statute which also permits guilty pleas to capital murder).
'oo See supra note 16 (noting Justices Blackmun and Powell's change of
heart).
101 Although the focus of arguments about the death penalty alters with the
mood of the times, the major arguments appear to be the following:
Pro
* Some criminals deserve to die.
* The death penalty effectively incapacitates.
* The death penalty deters violent crime.
* The death penalty promotes an orderly society by deterring
self-help vigilantism.
* Election results and opinion polls show that the public favors
capital punishment.
Con
* The state degrades human life and dignity when it kills its
own citizens.
* The death penalty is per se cruel; it inevitably causes not
only physical pain but psychological torment.
* The death penalty has not been proven to deter more
effectively than life in prison.
* Life in prison effectively incapacitates.
* Innocent people are executed by mistake.
The death penalty brutalizes instead of deterring.
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and support these arguments. Also unknown-and of great
consequence-is the method of constitutional analysis the court of
appeals will apply, and how much it will defer to the legislature.
1. Excessive Punishment
Per se arguments against capital punishment are traditionally
raised under one or more of three provisions commonly included
in state bills' of rights: the prohibition of excessive punishment and
the guarantees of due process and equal treatment. 0 2 As articu-
lated in the Eighth Amendment's interdiction of cruel and unusual
punishment, the first of these three grounds has dominated per se
arguments in the Supreme Court. The state courts have largely
echoed this focus, demonstrating how difficult it is for courts and
litigants to independently think about rights after long domination
by federal constitutional law. Moreover, the debate in state court
most often follows the patterns of the plurality and dissenting
arguments in Gregg v Georgia,"°3 although excessive penalty
The huge expense of death penalty prosecutions and broad
prosecutorial discretion in charging and plea-bargaining
result in arbitrary imposition.
The death penalty is inevitably racially and economically
discriminatory.
An informed public would reject the death penalty.
Every other Western democracy rejects the death penalty; South
Africa has just rejected it.
102 For example, the New York Constitution forbids the infliction of "cruel
and unusual punishment," and it also provides that "[n]o person shall be deprived
of life, liberty, or property without due process of law." N.Y. CONST. art. 1,
§§ 5, 6. The very first provision of the State Constitution also appears to
guarantee due process, by stating that "[n]o member of this state shall be
disenfranchised, or deprived of any of the rights or privileges secured to the
citizens thereof, unless by the law of the land. . . ." N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 1.
Section 11 provides, in pertinent part, that "[n]o person shall be denied the equal
protection of the laws of this state. .... No person shall, because of race, color,
creed, or religion, be subjected to any discrimination in his civil rights ..
N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 11.
.03 428 U.S. 153 (1976). In Gregg, the Supreme Court held that the death
penalty is not a per se violation of the Eighth Amendment. To reach this
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conclusion, the Court pointed out that the prevalence of death penalty statutes
showed that in fact, our society favors capital punishment. Id at 179-81. But
because the Eighth Amendment demands more than acceptability to contempo-
rary society, the Court went on to ask whether the death penalty "comports with
the basic concept of human dignity at the core of the Amendment." Id. at 182
(citation omitted). The Court framed this inquiry as whether capital punishment
is "so totally without penological justification that it results in the gratuitous
infliction of suffering." Id. at 183 (citations omitted). The Court pointedly
refused closer scrutiny, writing "we cannot 'invalidate a category of penalties
because we deem less severe penalties adequate to serve the ends of penology."'
Id. at 182-83 (quoting Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 451 (1972) (Powell, J.,
dissenting)).
The Court deemed the relevant penological goals to be retribution and
deterrence of capital crimes. Id. at 183. Pronouncing retribution neither a
"dominant" nor a "forbidden" goal, the Court described it as "unappealing to
many, but ... essential in an ordered society that asks its citizens to rely on
legal processes rather than self-help to vindicate their wrongs." Id. at 183.
Moreover, "the decision that capital punishment may be the appropriate sanction
in extreme cases is an expression of the community's belief that certain crimes
are themselves so grievous an affront to humanity that the only adequate
response may be the penalty of death." Id. at 184.
With respect to deterrence, the Court acknowledged that some studies
suggested that the death penalty was no greater a deterrent than lesser penalties,
and recognized that "there is no convincing empirical evidence either supporting
or refuting this view." Id. at 185. Nonetheless, the Court was satisfied that some
would-be murderers are deterred by the death penalty, and the Court left to local
legislatures the resolution of the complex factual issue of criminal deterrence. Id.
at 186.
Considering the final question before it-whether death was a disproportion-
ate punishment for the crime of murder-the Court determined that "when a life
has been taken deliberately ... we cannot say that the punishment is invariably
disproportionate to the crime." Id. at 187. Thus, the Court concluded that "the
punishment of death does not invariably violate the Constitution," and is "not a
form of punishment that may never be imposed, regardless of the circumstances
of the offense, regardless of the character of the offender, and regardless of the
procedure followed in reaching the decision to impose it." Id. at 169, 187.
Justices Brennan and Marshall dissented in Gregg, regarding the death
penalty as per se unconstitutional. 1d. at 227 (Brennan, J., dissenting); Id. at 231
(Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan incorporated his Furman concurrence,
where he formulated a four-part Eighth Amendment inquiry. Id. at 229 (Brennan,
J., concurring). Justice Brennan would consider a punishment "cruel and
unusual," that is, "not comport[ing] with human dignity" if it is 1) "so severe as
to be degrading to the dignity of human beings;" 2) arbitrarily inflicted; 3)
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arguments can be framed in many other ways." Deciding
"unacceptable to contemporary society;" and 4) "excessive," that is, "unneces-
sary." Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 270-88 (1972) (Brennan, J., con-
curring). Holding the death penalty to that test, in Gregg Justice Brennan
concluded, first, that it denies the humanity of persons executed and is "uniquely
degrading to human dignity." Gregg, 428 U.S. at 291 (Brennan, J., concurring).
Were the death penalty not "a punishment of longstanding usage and accep-
tance," he would consider it cruel and unusual on that ground alone. Id.
(Brennan, J., concurring). Second, because the death penalty is legally available
in many cases, but inflicted in very few, Justice Brennan argued that "it smacks
of little more than a lottery system." Id. at 293 (Brennan, J., concurring).
Rejecting the state's argument that the minute number of executions represents
"informed selectivity" rather than arbitrariness, Justice Brennan found the rarity
of death penalty impositions much more significant than the mere existence of
death penalty laws. Id. at 293-94 (Brennan, J., concurring). Finally, Justice
Brennan determined that the death penalty was unnecessary to deter violent
crimes because the risk of execution is remote, but that of long-term imprison-
ment is real. Id. at 302 (Brennan, J., concurring).
In his Gregg dissent, Justice Marshall asserted that the death penalty is per
se unconstitutional for two reasons: because it is excessive-that is, unnecessary
to any valid penological purpose-and because "the American people, fully
informed as to the purposes of the death penalty and its liabilities, would...
reject it as morally unacceptable."Id at 231-32 (Marshall, J., dissenting). The
death penalty cannot be justified by deterrence, according to Justice Marshall,
because "'the data which now exist show no correlation between the existence
of capital punishment and lower rates of capital crime."' Id. at 233 (Marshall, J.,
dissenting) (quoting UNITED NATIONS DEP'T OF ECON. & SOCIAL AFF., CAPITAL
PUNISHMENT 123 (1968)). Retribution, as discussed in the plurality opinion, is
broken down by Justice Marshall into three separate components: two "utili-
tarian" notions and one pure retribution idea. As to the two practical justifi-
cations-that "the death penalty preempts the citizenry from taking the law into
its own hands and reinforces moral values," Justice Marshall believed that lesser
penalties were sufficient to these ends. Id. at 238-39 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
But it was the notion of pure retribution that appalled Justice Marshall the most:
The mere fact that the community demands the murderer's life in
return for the evil he has done cannot sustain the death penalty, for as
[the plurality opinion] remind[s] us, the Eighth Amendment demands
more than that a challenged punishment be acceptable to contemporary
society. . . . [Rather, it must] compor[t] with the basic concept of
human dignity at the core of the Amendment.
Id. at 240 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (quotations omitted).
" Indeed, it can be argued that the emulation of federal death penalty juris-
prudence is not only unnecessary, but also potentially disastrous. A state court
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excessive punishment challenges, most state courts tend to presume
that the legislature acted rationally in enacting capital punishment
and they therefore exercise "great restraint."' 5 These courts
follow the Gregg plurality in asking only whether capital punish-
ment is "so totally without penological justification that it results
in the gratuitous infliction of suffering.' 1 6 To the extent that the
Supreme Court's deference to the legislature is based on its own
institutional limitations and its concern for federalism, the state
courts' exercise of the same deference does not seem entirely
logical.
The majority opinion in State v Ramseur..7 is an example of
complete deference to the judgments of the legislature and
"society." The New Jersey Supreme Court there reached the
following conclusions to hold that the death penalty did not violate
the state constitution:
The view that the death penalty does not accord with
contemporary standards of decency draws much of its
support from those convinced, for many reasons, of the
death penalty's futility, indecency, and inhumanity. They
include some of the best-informed students of the subject,
many of whom believe that society would share their views
if it were better informed.. . . The "contemporary standard
of decency" against which the death penalty must be
that adopts the reasoning of the Gregg plurality to find the death penalty not per
se unconstitutional inevitably buys into the Supreme Court's post-Furman
consistency-individualization jurisprudence. In a scholarly and powerful dissent
in Ramseur, where the New Jersey Supreme Court adopted Gregg under the state
constitution, Justice Handler argued that the result would be the arbitrary
imposition of the death penalty and a jurisprudential morass of incoherence and
wasted resources. State v. Ramseur, 524 A.2d 188, 301-21 (N.J. 1987) (Handler,
J., dissenting). Although leaning toward the conviction that the death penalty is
per se unconstitutional, Justice Handler argued that the only conceivable
framework for its equitable imposition would be a state constitutional doctrine
of fundamental fairness grounded in the state guarantee of due process. Id.
(Handler, J., dissenting).
10' State v. Ross, 646 A.2d 1318, 1356 (Conn. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S.
Ct. 1133 (1995).
106 Gregg, 428 U.S. at 183 (citations omitted).
107 524 A.2d 188 (N.J. 1987).
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tested, however, is that of the community, not that of its
scientists, penologists, or jurists .... [I]t is a widely held
belief, and a strongly held one in our society, that the
appropriate penalty for murder may be death. 1 8
The Legislature, speaking for its citizens, has deter-
mined that the demands of justice are met by executing
those who murder. °9
We respect the arguments of those who believe that a
more enlightened view is that the death penalty serves no
legitimate penological purpose. In this area of crime and
punishment, however, it is not our function to weigh
competing arguments and determine which is more
enlightened. The wisdom of the death penalty is not for
this Court to decide." 0
A troubling omission in Ramseur, and indeed in all but one of
the post-Gregg cases that have considered the question of whether
capital punishment is cruel,"' is any discussion of what it is like
for the condemned person to be sentenced to death and then
executed. Instead, courts discuss the penological views of societies,
past and present, remarking that cruel punishments like crucifixion
and immolation, although once popular, are today viewed with
distaste. They then reason tautologically that because the death
penalty, unlike sentences of torture, still exists, the citizenry must
want it to exist. Therefore, contemporary standards of decency do
not deem death a cruel punishment. Therefore, the courts have no
power to abolish it.
l0' Id. at 211 (citations omitted).
109 Id. at 215. Yet the court notes that "[tihe legislative history of the [Death
Penalty] Act provides no persuasive evidence of the Legislature's purpose." Id
at 214.
110 Id. at 216 (citations omitted).
"' Suffolk Dist. Attorney v. Watson, 411 N.E.2d 1274, 1283 (Mass.
1980)("[T]he death penalty is unacceptable under contemporary standards of
decency in its unique and inherent capacity to inflict pain. The mental agony is,
simply and beyond question, a horror."), superseded by statute as stated in
Commonwealth v. Colon-Cruz, 470 N.E.2d 116 (1984).
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Opponents of the death penalty find a great deal wrong with
this reasoning, not the least of which is that it fails to take into
consideration the possibility that Clarence Darrow was right when
he said, "that capital punishment is horrible and cruel is the reason
for its existence."" 2 Given the fact that the legislatures of ten
states have recently introduced bills that would provide for the
punishment of caning, it appears that the society that votes for the
death penalty is one that wants to inflict cruel punishments on
criminals. The job of the courts in that case is, of course, to
prevent the public from getting what it wants.
It is significant that the only courts to hold the death penalty
unconstitutional are the ones that include among their members'
opinions a graphic description of the death penalty from the point
of view of the condemned." 3
"2 Id. at 1290 (citing ATTORNEYS FOR THE NAACP LEGAL DEF. & EDUC.
FUND, A Cruel and Unusual Punishment, in VOICES AGAINST DEATH 264, 283
(1976).
"3 For example, a concurring opinion in Watson recounts the following:
For over two years, Henry Arsenault 'lived on death row feeling as if
the Court's sentence were slowly being carried out.' Arsenault could
not stop thinking about death. Despite several stays, he never believed
he could escape execution. 'There was a day to day choking, tremulous
fear that quickly became suffocating.' If he slept at all, fear of death
snapped him awake sweating. His throat was clenched so tight he often
could not eat. His belly cramped, and he could not move his bowels.
He urinated uncontrollably. He could not keep still. And all the while
a guard watched him, so he would not commit suicide. The guard was
there when he had his nightmares and there when he wet his pants.
Arsenault retained neither privacy nor dignity. Apart from the guards
he was alone much of the time as the day of his execution neared.
The time came. He walked to the death chamber and turned toward the
chair. Stopping him, the warden explained that the execution would not
be for over an hour. Arsenault sat on the other side of the room as the
witnesses filed in behind a one-way mirror. When the executioner
tested the chair, the lights dimmed. Arsenault heard other prisoners
scream. After the chaplain gave him last rites, Arsenault heard the door
slam shut and the noise echoing, the clock ticking. He wet his pants.
Less than half an hour before the execution, the Lieutenant Governor
commuted his sentence. Arsenault's legs would not hold him up.
Guards carried him back to his cell. He was trembling uncontrollably.
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It is also interesting that the New Jersey Supreme Court, in
holding that the wisdom of the death penalty was not for it to
decide, implicitly recognized the cruelty of the death penalty. In
discussing the aggravating factors in the statute, the court found
that "execution-style" murders may definitely be considered
"depraved" because
if the victim is aware as a practical certainty that he is
about to be executed, his psychological suffering obviously
is extreme. In making the victim aware of such imminent
execution, the defendant must have as his purpose for
doing so that this knowledge will cause the victim to
endure great psychological suffering."4
The state courts' failure to examine the reality of the death
penalty in deciding whether it violates the Eighth Amendment, and
their decision to treat the issue instead simply as a separation-of-
powers question, allows them to avoid confronting the moral fact
that death is different from all other punishments.
2. Due Process
An argument made less frequently than the excessive-penalty
argument is that the death penalty violates substantive due process,
an argument of which the Supreme Court has taken little notice.
Although it has succeeded just once, in Commonwealth v
O'Neal,"5 a Massachusetts case, the due process argument is
nonetheless a simple and intuitive argument that cries out to be
made.
A doctor sedated him. And he was moved off death row.
Id. at 1290 (Liacos, J., concurring) (en banc); see also People v. Anderson, 493
P.2d 880 (Cal. 1972).
"4 Ramseur, 524 A.2d at 232 n.39.
s 9 N.E.2d 676 (Mass. 1975); see also Ramseur, 524 A.2d at 214 n.40
(explaining and dismissing a due process argument). In New Jersey, the challenge
was raised under Article I, § 1, which guarantees the rights of "enjoying and
defending life and liberty." N.J. CONST. art. I, § 1. Like its adoption of Gregg,




Traditional excessive-punishment challenges to the death
penalty require the government simply to meet a test of
rationality-that is, it must show that the penalty was enacted for
some reason other than a mere legislative desire to inflict gratuitous
suffering. In contrast, the due process argument begins with the
proposition that the right to life is fundamental, the basis of all
other rights and the right without which other rights do not
exist." 6 Accordingly, when the state proposes to deprive a citizen
of life, it must demonstrate that it has a compelling interest in
doing so and that no less restrictive, more precisely adapted means
exist for fulfilling the stated goal.
117
The state's generally merited assumption that its judgments will
automatically be awarded the presumption of rationality is well
illustrated in O'Neal. There, the state, apparently assuming that the
court would defer to legislative judgment, simply did not address
the issue of the justification for the enactment of the death penalty.
When the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts postponed the
proceedings to allow the parties to adduce evidence on the question,
the state could not produce convincing proof that the death penalty
was necessary to further any compelling state interest."'
Opponents of the death penalty in New York might reasonably
feel optimistic about their chances of success should the court of
appeals agree to apply strict scrutiny to the capital punishment
statute, for even the Supreme Court has agreed that existing data is
inconclusive on the issue of whether the death penalty deters
would-be murderers." 9 The far more difficult task will be to
convince the court to depart from the other state courts that have
viewed challenges to the death penalty as they would a claim that
a lengthy prison sentence for the statutory rape of a seventeen-year-
old is excessive; that is, as a subject firmly within the province of
the legislature.
116 Ramseur, 524 A.2d at 213.
117 Id.
118 ONeal, 339 N.E.2d at 676.
"9 Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 184-85 (1976).
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3. Equal Treatment
The third possible ground of state constitutional per se
challenge to the death penalty is the guarantee of equal treat-
ment. 0 The argument is that the death penalty inherently and
inevitably discriminates against defendants who are poor, Black, or
more usually both.
In McCleskey v Kemp, 121 the Supreme Court was presented
with the question "whether a complex statistical study that indicates
a risk that racial considerations enter into capital sentencing
determinations proves that [the death sentence of petitioner, a Black
man,] is unconstitutional under the Eighth or Fourteenth
Amendment.'
122
Concerning McCleskey's equal protection argument under the
Fourteenth Amendment, the Court held that such a claim requires
the petitioner to shoulder the burden of proving the existence of
purposeful discrimination. 23 Thus, in a death penalty case, a
condemned defendant would have to prove that "the legislature
enacted or maintained the death penalty statute because of an
anticipated racially discriminatory effect."' 24 The Court rejected
the Equal Protection claim in McCleskey because the petitioner
failed to show a discriminatory purpose behind the Georgia
statute. 1
25
McCleskey also argued that the Georgia system violated the
Eighth Amendment because it was arbitrary and capricious in
application by allowing racial considerations to influence capital
sentencing decisions.2 6 The Court rejected this claim because a
120 New York's Bill of Rights provides that "[n]o person shall be denied the
equal protection of the laws of [their] state. . . ." and that "[n]o person shall,
because of race, color, creed, or religion, be subjected to any discrimination in
his civil rights. . . ." N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 11.
12! 481 U.S. 279 (1987).
122 Id. at 282-83.
113 Id. at 298.
124 Id.
121 Id. at 298-99.
126 Id. at 308.
192
CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES
study, which was conducted by David C. Baldus, George
Woodworth and Charles Pulaski introduced to prove racial
discrimination showed no more than that "a particular factor [race]
entered into some [sentencing] decisions,"' 27 not that race entered
into all decisions or into the decision in McCleskey's case. 2 '
Therefore, said the Court, the question is "at what point the risk of
racial discrimination in capital sentencing becomes constitutionally
unacceptable."' 29 McCleskey argued that a "likelihood" of race
discrimination was constitutionally unacceptable. 3 ' The Court
disagreed: "At most, the Baldus study indicates a discrepancy that
appears to correlate with race. Apparent disparities in sentencing
are an inevitable part of our criminal justice system." '131
The Court went on to explain that "[i]n light of safeguards
designed to minimize racial bias in the process, the fundamental
value of a jury trial in our criminal justice system, and the benefits
that [jury] discretion [in sentencing] provides to criminal defen-
dants," the racial bias shown in the study was not constitutionally
significant.' 2 Moreover, the Court was concerned that, should it
accept McCleskey's claim, inevitably noncapital defendants would
raise the same challenge and open the floodgates of litigation.'33
The legislature was the body to hear such complaints, not the
courts. '34
Because of the pervasiveness of racial bias in the criminal
justice system, equal treatment challenges have been brought in a
.27 Id. See DAVID C. BALDUS, EQUAL JUSTICE AND THE DEATH PENALTY
(1990). The Baldus study "purports to show a disparity in the imposition of the
death sentence in Georgia based on the race of the murder victim, and, to a lesser
extent, the race of the defendant." McClesky v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279,286 (1987).
The study indicates that "black defendants ... who kill white victims have the
greatest likelihood of receiving the death penalty." Id. at 287.
12' McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 308.
129 Id. at 309 (citations omitted).
130 "McClesky asks us to accept the likelihood allegedly shown by the
Baldus study as the constitutional measure of an unacceptable risk of social
prejudice influencing capital sentencing decisions." Id. at 309.
' Id. at 312.
132 Id. at 313.
133 Id. at 314-17.
134 Id. at 319.
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number of state courts.'35 Thus far, the argument has not suc-
ceeded on its own, although the decision of the Supreme Judicial
Court of Massachusetts in Suffolk District Attorney v Watson136
was based in significant part on the conviction that the death
penalty is disproportionately imposed on Black people. 37 In
Watson, the court relied upon the Baldus study, and also upon the
President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration
of Justice which concluded that "there is evidence that the
imposition of the death sentence and the exercise of dispensing
power by the courts and the executive follow discriminatory
patterns. The death sentence is disproportionately imposed and
carried out on the poor, the Negro and the members of unpopular
groups."'' 38
Examining statistics concerning the imposition of death
penalties in Florida, Georgia and Texas under post-Furman statutes
upheld by the Supreme Court, the Massachusetts court concluded
that "very little has changed as to arbitrariness and discrimi-
nation.' ' 139 Moreover, the court "reject[ed] any suggestion that
racial discrimination is confined to the South or to any other
geographical area."' 4 ° Significantly, the court also took judicial
131 See, e.g., State v. Mallet, 732 S.W.2d 527, cert. denied by Mallet v.
Missouri, 484 U.S. 933 (1987); State v. Ramseur, 524 A.2d 188 (N.J. 1987);
State v. Jenkins, 473 N.E.2d 264 (Ohio 1984); Suffolk Dist. Attorney v. Watson,
411 N.E.2d 1274, 1285 (Mass. 1980), superseded by statute as stated in
Commonwealth v. Colon-Cruz, 470 N.E.2d 116 (Mass. 1984).
136 411 N.E.2d 1274 (Mass. 1980), superseded by statute as stated in
Commonwealth v. Colon-Cruz, 470 N.E.2d 116 (Mass. 1984).
117 Id at 1285.
131 Watson, 411 N.E.2d at 1285 (citing THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A
FREE SOCIETY, A REPORT BY THE PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON LAW
ENFORCEMENT AND ADMIN. OF JUST. 143 (1976)); see also C. BLACK, CAPITAL
PUNISHMENT: THE INEVITABILITY OF CAPRICE AND MISTAKE (1974).
139 Watson, 411 N.E.2d at 1285.
141 Id at 1286. In Watson, the court noted that
[e]xamination of death sentences imposed in Florida, Georgia and
Texas under post-Furman statutes upheld by the Supreme Court in
1976 indicates that very little has changed as to arbitrariness and
discrimination. The criminal homicide data from the date of the post-
Furman statutes through 1977 indicate the following: In Florida, of 286
blacks who had killed whites, forty-eight (16.8%) were sentenced to
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notice of "the existence of racial prejudice in some persons in this
Commonwealth [of Massachusetts].' 4' The court concluded that
while our society's "failure to bring evenhandedness to the entire
spectrum of criminal punishment"'42 does not require the aban-
donment of all such punishments on constitutional grounds, "the
supreme punishment of death, inflicted as it is by chance and
caprice, may not stand."' 143 The arbitrariness and discrimination
which the Supreme Court had found "inevitable," and therefore
constitutionally permissible, the Massachusetts court instead found
to offend the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights.
144
The decision of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court
contrasts for two reasons with the decisions of other state courts
that have been presented with the issue of race bias in capital
sentencing. First, the Massachusetts court did not treat McCleskey
as having been finally dispositive of the issue as did, for example,
the Ohio Supreme Court which declined to review the issue
because "[t]he Supreme Court recently resolved this issue in
McCleskey... . a criminal defendant must prove that... purpose-
ful discrimination had an effect on him.' 45
Second, in concluding that racial bias would inevitably be an
unacceptable factor in capital sentencing in Massachusetts, the
Supreme Judicial Court was willing to rely on the same statistics
used by the Supreme Court in McCleskey, as well as on statistics
death; of 11l whites who killed blacks, none were sentenced to death.
In Georgia, of 268 blacks who killed whites, thirty-seven (14.3%) were
sentenced to death; of seventy-one whites who killed blacks, two
(2.8%) were sentenced to death. In Texas, of 344 blacks who killed
whites, twenty-seven (7.8%) were sentenced to death; of 143 whites
who killed blacks, none were sentenced to death.
Id. at 1285. Moreover, the Court relied on the experience of Ohio under a post-
Furman statute through 1977 which showed that, "of 173 black persons who
killed white persons, thirty-seven of them (21.4%) were sentenced to death. Of




144 Id. at 1286; see also MASS. CONST. art. 26.
145 State v. Zuern, 512 N.E.2d 585, 593 (Ohio 1987) (quoting Wayte v.
United States, 470 U.S. 598, 608 (1985)).
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from other states, and on its own knowledge that the citizens of
Massachusetts were not miraculously free of racial prejudice. Other
state courts, in contrast, have held that the inability of capital
defendants to produce new, local statistics comparable to those in
the Baldus study defeated their claims of race discrimination in
sentencing.'46 For example, the Missouri Supreme Court sitting
en banc found that "[c]ompared to the statistics introduced by
defendant in McCleskey, the statistics offered by the defendant here
... are insufficient to establish such a claim." '147 The New Jersey
Supreme Court was "not convinced" that the requirement that a
capital jury's discretion be rationally guided had failed to protect
Black defendants from race discrimination in the imposition of their
capital sentences in other states or that it would inevitably fail in
New Jersey: 14 "No court has found constitutionally significant
evidence of racial discrimination in the application of a post-
Furman death penalty statute and no such evidence has been
presented to us in this case.', 149 The court agreed, of course, to
receive in the future any new evidence that condemned persons
were being executed in New Jersey in a racially discriminatory
manner. 5 ° It refused, however, "preemptively to invalidate the
[Death Penalty] Act on the theory that it will inevitably be applied
in a racially discriminatory fashion."''
These state court cases raise the troubling notion that a decade
must pass and two thousand New Yorkers must be executed (or
languish on death row) before a statistically valid challenge to race
bias in capital sentencing can be raised under the state constitution.
And even then, if the court of appeals follows the lead of the other
state courts marching in lockstep with the Supreme Court and
'46 See State v. Mallett, 732 S.W.2d 527 (Mo. 1987), cert. deniedby Mallett
v. Missouri, 484 U.S. 933 (1987).
147 Id. at 539 ("Of those individuals (excluding appellant) who have been
sentenced to death in Missouri since 1977, 39% are non-white. Of those non-
white row inmates, 53% had white victims. Of the white death row inmates, 74%
had white victims. Missouri's racial composition is 88.4% white and 11.6% non-
white.").





requires a showing of purposeful race discrimination in an
individual case, no defendant will ever meet the burden. It is thus
obvious that considerable thought must go into what evidence
might convince the court of appeals that the risk of race discrimi-
nation in capital sentencing determinations is real, despite the
provisions in the statute designed to root it out.'52
In addition to the grounds of state constitutional challenges
advanced--excessive punishment, due process, or equal
treatment-the method of constitutional analysis employed by the
court of appeals will also be important to the fate of per se
challenges. As discussed above, the court of appeals may, like the
Massachusetts high court, simply interpret the language of the state
constitution, using any and all of the traditional tools of interpre-
tation. On the other hand, given the fact that the language of the
excessive punishment and due process provisions of the New York
Constitution is so close to that of the Federal Constitution,'53 the
court of appeals may choose to adopt the "noninterpretive" analysis
152 The New York Criminal Procedure Law provides that the parties may,
on motion, examine prospective jurors individually and outside the presence of
other prospective jurors regarding the possibility of racial bias. Death Penalty Act
§ 14, 1995 N.Y. LAWS at 5 (amending the Criminal Procedure Law by adding
a new § 270.16). New York's Criminal Procedure Law also requires the court
of appeals to "review whether the sentence of death is excessive or dispro-
portionate to the penalty imposed in similar cases by virtue of the race of the
defendant or a victim of the crime for which the defendant was convicted."
Death Penalty Act § 27, 1995 N.Y. LAWS at 13-14 (amending N.Y. CRIM. PROC.
LAW § 470.30 (McKinney 1994)). As Justice Antonin Scalia pointed out in
J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel TB., however, voir dire ofjurors concerning their racial
biases is inevitably ineffective because frequently jurors are unaware of their own
biases and therefore cannot answer truthfully when asked about them. 114 S. Ct.
1419, 1438-39 (1994).
153 The Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I,
§ 5, of the New York Constitution both forbid "cruel and unusual punishment."
U.S. CONST. amend. VIII; N.Y. CONST. art I, § 5. The Fourteenth Amendment
to the United States Constitution and § 6 of the New York Constitution both
forbid the deprivation of "life, liberty or property without due process of law."
U.S. CONST. amend XIV; N.Y. CONST. art. 1, § 6. It should be noted, however,
that Article I, § 6, begins the New York Constitution with the promise that no
New Yorker shall be "deprived of any of the rights or privileges secured to any
citizen.., unless by the law of the land." N.Y. CONST. art I, § 1.
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favored by the New Jersey Supreme Court and require a showing
of state-specific reasons sufficient to justify departure from federal
precedent. 4 Argument over the proper method of analysis seems
inevitable, and litigants must therefore be prepared to support their
arguments with social-science data about New York and with
reference to our judicial, legislative and social history.
Indeed, no matter what method or combination of methods the
court of appeals uses, the factual support adduced for arguments for
and against the death penalty will be crucial. Whether the death
penalty deters, whether it offends community standards of decency,
whether its immense expense will result in arbitrary enforcement
and whether it inevitably falls disproportionately on poor and
minority defendants are just some of the questions upon which
empirical studies can shed light. In short, we need to try to
understand our past as well as our present in order to debate New
York's death penalty. Fresh inquiry is imperative-inquiry into the
social, constitutional, legislative and judicial history of both the
state and the nation, insofar as it bears on punishment in general,
and the death penalty in particular.
B. Challenges to the Statute
1. Death-Avoidance Guilty Pleas
New York's Criminal Procedure Law formerly forbade pleas of
guilty to capital murder.' However, the new death penalty
legislation amends this provision, adding that a defendant "may
enter such a plea with both the permission of the Court and the
consent of the People when the agreed upon sentence is either life
imprisonment without parole or a term of imprisonment for ...
murder in the first degree."'56 In other words, the state may not
154 See supra notes 65-70 and accompanying text.
'" N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW §§ 220.10(5)(e), 220.30(3)(b)(vii) (McKinney
1993).
156 Death Penalty Act § 10, 1995 N.Y. LAWS at 4 (amending N.Y. CRIM.
PROC. LAW § 220.10(5)(e) (McKinney 1993)); Death Penalty Act § 11, 1995
N.Y. LAWS at 4 (amending N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 220.30(3)(b)(vii)
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put to death a defendant who pleads guilty as charged. Because a
defendant who goes to trial risks death, and one who pleads guilty
avoids the risk, it will undoubtedly be argued that the new statute
impermissibly burdens the guarantee against compelled self-
incrimination and the right to trial by jury that are contained in
both the New York and Federal Constitutions, 15 7 and that the
imposition of the death penalty is therefore unconstitutional in all
circumstances.
The Supreme Court has held that the availability of a death-
avoidance plea'58 unconstitutionally chills the exercise of Fifth
and Sixth Amendment rights.'59 In United States v. Jackson.6 °
and Pope v United States,"6' the Court struck down the death
penalty provisions of the Federal Kidnapping and Bank Robbery
Acts because under both statutes, the state could impose the death
penalty after a jury trial, but the state could only sentence to prison
those defendants who pleaded guilty as charged or chose bench
trials.'62 This procedure was held to penalize defendants who
pleaded not guilty and to "needlessly chill the exercise of basic
constitutional rights., 163 Relying on Jackson, state courts have
(McKinney 1993)).
'17 U.S. CONST. amends. V, VI; N.Y. CONST. art. I, §§ 2, 6.
' Used here, the term "death-avoidance plea" refers only to statutorily
permitted pleas to murder in the first degree. The term does not refer to
bargained-for pleas to lesser, noncapital offenses. One can argue, however, that
the availability of plea bargains in capital cases, unlike plea-bargaining in other
situations where only differing terms of years are at stake, also puts an
unconstitutionally high price on the exercise of the right to defend and the right
to be tried by a jury. As with what we term here "death-avoidance pleas," the
proper remedy is not the abolition of plea-bargaining in capital cases, but
abolition of the death penalty entirely. See infra notes 163-65 and accompanying
text.
' See United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570, 582-83 (1968); Pope v.
United States, 392 U.S. 651, 651 (1968).
160 390 U.S. 570 (1968).
161 392 U.S. 651 (1968).
162 Jackson, 390 U.S. at 578-79, 583; Pope, 392 U.S. at 651.
163 Jackson, 390 U.S. at 582-83. Jackson invalidated sentences of death; it
did not mean, however, that all guilty pleas entered under the statute were per
se coerced. See Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 746-47 (1970).
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likewise held that the availability of death-avoidance pleas violates
the Federal Constitution, their state constitutions, or both.
164
Upon finding these constitutional violations, the state courts,
like the Supreme Court, were obliged to sever and strike either the
death penalty or the plea provision. 165 New Jersey, Washington,
164 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Colon-Cruz, 470 N.E.2d 116 (Mass. 1994)
(violating the Massachusetts Constitution); State v. Johnson, 595 A.2d 498 (N.H.
1991) (violating the New Hampshire and the Federal Constitutions); State v.
Frampton, 627 P.2d 922 (Wash. 1981) (holding that the procedure is "unconsti-
tutional" and citing Jackson); State v. Funicello, 286 A.2d 55 (N.J. 1972)
(violating the New Jersey and the Federal Constitutions), cert. denied by New
Jersey v. Presha, 408 U.S. 942 (1972).
New York had death-avoidance pleas prior to Jackson. Although the New
York Court of Appeals never squarely held that the death penalty was unconsti-
tutional if such pleas were available, the court indicated as much, and the
Criminal Procedure Law was amended to forbid guilty pleas in capital crimes.
N.Y. CRIM. PROC. §§ 220.10 (5)(e), 220.30 (3)(b)(vii) (McKinney 1993); see
People v. Black, 30 N.Y.2d 593, 281 N.E.2d 849, 330 N.Y.S.2d 804 (1972),
affirming 34 A.D.2d 999, 312 N.Y.S.2d 658 (2d Dep't 1970); cf People v. A.C.,
27 N.Y.2d 79, 86, 261 N.E.2d 620, 625, 313 N.Y.S.2d 695, 701 (1970) (holding
a statute in a noncapital case to be unconstitutional because it "offers an
individual a reward for waiving a fundamental constitutional tight, or imposes
a harsher penalty for asserting it . . ."; relying on Jackson).
165 The only other possibility consistent with Jackson would be to interpret
the statute to require capital jury sentencing of defendants who plead guilty.
Given the explicit language of New York's statute, however, that route seems
barred. It would seem thus that only the legislature can save both guilty pleas
and the death penalty. Yet, ironically, the possibility of a death sentence upon a
plea of guilty may be as constitutionally dubious as the impossibility of such a
sentence.
Judge Hans Linde of the Oregon Supreme Court, an important figure in the
New Federalism movement, has argued that no person may constitutionally be
put to death without "the highest degree of certainty by a unanimous jury that
every element of a capital crime has been proved beyond a reasonable doubt
... " State v. Wagner, 752 P.2d 1136, 1186 (Linde, J., dissenting). Judge
Linde's argument, rejected by the majority of the Oregon Court, is based in part
on heightened concern for the rights of capital defendants reflected in a state
constitutional provision that forbids, as does New York's Constitution, the waiver
of jury trials in capital cases. Id. (Linde, J., dissenting). It may well have been
to avoid an objection, such as Judge Linde's, that the New York Legislature
created the death-avoidance plea. In so doing, however, it fell afoul of Jackson.
Such paradoxes characterizecontemporary death penaltyjurisprudence: legislators
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New Hampshire and Massachusetts all struck the death penalty,'66
following the example of Jackson, where the Court considered that
forcing every capital defendant to go to trial would be an unneces-
sarily oppressive remedy.67
The only distinction between the new New York statute and the
statutes condemned in Jackson and Pope appears to be a distinction
that makes no doctrinal difference. The defendants in those cases
could escape the threat of death by choosing either a guilty plea or
a bench trial. However, the New York Constitution forbids the
waiver of trial by jury whenever "the crime charged may be
punishable by death.', 168 The choice, thus, is between a guilty
plea or a jury trial. On the basis of the same distinction-New
Jersey also forbids the waiver of trial by jury in capital cases-the
New Jersey Supreme Court initially concluded that Jackson did not
apply to New Jersey's death penalty. 169 In State v Forcella, the
court reasoned first that the right to a jury only attached once a
defendant chose to go to trial, and that, because such a defendant
could not waive a jury, the right to trial by jury could not possibly
be burdened by the guilty-plea provision. 71 With respect to the
right not to plead guilty, the court contended that its invocation in
Jackson was unnecessary to the decision there, 171 and that in any
event, any burden on the right not to plead guilty was not needless,
but justifiable because the provision operated to the benefit of
defendants who pled guilty.172
The dissenters in Forcella responded that the right to be tried
by a jury is not just the right of a defendant who goes to trial, but
rather, one of the rights a defendant gives up by pleading guilty,
and that a defendant who pleaded guilty in New Jersey thus gave
and prosecutors seek to avoid one constitutional pitfall only to fall into another.
See infra part IV.B.8. and Conclusion.
166 Colon-Cruz, 470 N.E.2d at 129; Johnson, 595 A.2d at 504; Frampton,
627 P.2d at 927; Funicello, 286 A.2d at 59.
167 Jackson, 390 U.S. at 584.
168 N.Y. CONST. art I, § 2.
169 See, e.g., State v. Forcella, 245 A.2d 181, 269 (N.J. 1968).
170 Id. at 185.
171 Id
172 Id. at 187-88.
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up both the guarantee against compelled self-incrimination and the
right to a jury.173 Moreover, the dissenters maintained, Jackson
itself answered the rest of the majority's contentions. According to
Jackson, the vice of the federal death penalty statute was not that
it encouraged the sacrifice of rights without conferring a benefit,
but rather, that it needlessly penalized-by death-the assertion of
such rights. 74 The defendants in Forcella appealed to the
Supreme Court, which remanded for reconsideration in light of
Jackson, seemingly vindicating the dissenters.'75 Upon reconsider-
ation, the New Jersey Supreme Court capitulated, holding that it
could not constitutionally impose the death penalty after trial under
a statutory scheme that included death-avoidance pleas. 7 6
Thus it would appear that under Jackson, New York's statute
violates the Federal Constitution. But the ultimate outcome of such
a challenge is far from certain. The Jackson argument is, of course,
only compelling so long as Jackson, decided in 1968, remains good
law. Would the Supreme Court, as currently constituted and in
keeping with its policy of deregulation, distinguish or overrule
Jackson? There is some reason to believe so. If the court of appeals
were to strike down either the death-avoidance plea or the death
penalty itself on the basis of Jackson alone, the Supreme Court
could, of course, review the decision.'77 Were the court of ap-
peals to reach the same result on the basis of both state and Federal
Constitutions, or on the basis of the New York Constitution alone,
however, the Supreme Court could not review the decision. 7 '
Both prudence and principle counsel exploration of state consti-
tutional grounds here.
'73 Id. at 199-200 (Jacobs & Hall, J.J., dissenting).
'7 Id. at 198 (Jacobs & Hall, J.J., dissenting).
'7 Funicello v. New Jersey, 403 U.S. 948 (1971). In the meanwhile,
appellant Forcella had died of natural causes.
176 State v. Funicello, 286 A.2d 55 (N.J. 1972), cert. denied by New Jersey
v. Presha, 408 U.S. 942 (1972). The court invalidated the death penalty provision
and all pending death sentences.
177 See JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
§ 2.1 (1991).
178 Id. at § 2.13; see also supra note 65.
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Certainly, the guarantee of trial by jury contained in the New
York Constitution suggests on its face even more protection than
the Sixth Amendment promises: the right is to be "forever
inviolate" and may not be waived in a capital trial. 179 The state
constitution uses language identical to that of the Federal
Constitution to prohibit compelled self-incrimination; inquiry into
the constitution's history and interpretation is needed, as is inquiry
into New York's former prohibition of death-avoidance pleas,
which seems to have been a response to Jackson. Serious thought
must also go into the issues of remedy and severability. 80 Final-
ly, the magnitude of the guilty-plea issue makes early resolution
crucial-resolution before direct appeal of the first conviction under
the new statute.
2. Death Qualification of Jurors
New York's death penalty statute provides for a bifurcated
trial-a "guilt" phase and a "penalty" phase-and, ordinarily, just
one "unitary" jury to sit at both phases.' The statute also pro-
vides for the "death qualification" of the jury prior to the guilt
phase. "'82 Death qualification refers in general to the exclusion by
challenges for cause of potential jurors whose opposition to the
death penalty would prevent or impair their ability to properly
discharge their duties as jurors.
179 N.Y. CONST. art. 1, § 2.
SO The Death Penalty Act provides for the severability of any provision
declared unconstitutional. Death Penalty Act § 37, 1995 N.Y. LAWS at 25.
"' Death Penalty Act § 20, 1995 N.Y. LAWS at 6 (amending the Criminal
Procedure Law by adding a new § 400.27).
112 Death Penalty Act § 15, 1995 N.Y. LAWS at 5 (amending N.Y. CRIM.
PROC. LAW § 270.20(1)(f)(McKinney 1993)). This section permits challenges for
cause to prospective jurors when
[t]he crime charged may be punishable by death and the prospective
juror entertains such conscientious opinions either against or in favor
of such punishment as to preclude such juror from rendering an
impartial verdict or from properly exercising the discretion conferred
upon such juror by law in the determination of a sentence.
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Few would argue that jurors who could not impose the death
penalty should sit at the sentencing phase, or that jurors who
because of opposition to the death penalty could not vote to convict
at the guilt phase should be allowed to sit at all in capital cases.
But what has been repeatedly challenged is the exclusion from the
guilt-determination phase of jurors whose scruples about capital
punishment would not prevent them from fairly reaching a verdict.
Although thus far, no challenge has succeeded,"8 3 death qualifi-
cation"8 4 bears so centrally on basic guarantees of fairness that it
seems certain to be the subject of state constitutional challenge in
New York.
That death qualification at the guilt phase is an historical
vestige that has lost its historical justification is beyond debate.
Simply put, when, as it was for most of its existence, the death
penalty was mandatory and capital trials were unitary, the state had
an obvious interest in excluding jurors who could not impose a
death sentence. However, the bifurcated trial preferred by the
Supreme Court would seem to have all but extinguished any
legitimate interest in excluding from the guilt phase jurors who
believe themselves able to convict but unable to impose a death
sentence. 18 5
Yet anachronism is not the most unsettling charge against death
qualification. On the basis of concededly valid social-scientific
studies, it has long been argued that the death qualification process
183 See Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162 (1986); see also State v. Alvarez,
872 P.2d 450, 454-55 (Utah 1994); State v. Ramseur, 524 A.2d 188, 250-54
(N.J. 1987). However, death qualification has generated both concern and dissent
in the courts that have considered it. See, e.g., Alvarez, 872 P.2d at 462
(Zimmerman & Stewart, J.J., concurring; Durham, J., dissenting); Ramseur, 524
A.2d at 295-300, 345-48 (O'Hern, J., concurring; Handler, J., dissenting);
Commonwealth v. Maxwell, 477 A.2d 1309, 1318-21 (Pa. 1984) (Nix, J.,
dissenting), cert. denied by Maxwell v. Pennsylvania, 469 U.S. 971 (1984).
184 For convenience, the term "death qualification" will be used in the rest
of this section to refer only to the exclusion at the guilt phase of potential jurors
who could not vote for the death penalty at the sentencing phase.
85 The Court stated in Gregg that arbitrary and capricious imposition of the
death penalty could best be avoided by a bifurcated proceeding. Gregg v.
Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 191-92 (1976).
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produces juries biased in favor of conviction." 6 Accepting the
empirical evidence of bias, the Supreme Court nonetheless held that
death qualification does not violate the Federal Constitution in
Lockhart v McCree.8 7 Moreover, state constitutional challenges
to the death penalty based on death qualification have thus far
failed, although passionate dissent has been registered.'
The opinions of the New Jersey Supreme Court in State v.
Ramseur.s9 instructively set out the terms of the debate over
death qualification in state court. The majority rejected the
defendant's claim that death qualification violated the right to an
impartial jury inherent in the state constitutional guarantee of trial
by jury.9 ° Finding no distinctive New Jersey attitude toward the
death penalty, and noting somewhat illogically that "this Court
previously permitted death qualification in trials where the guilt and
penalty phases were combined,"19 ' the majority adopted the
position of the United States Supreme Court in Lockhart. Accept-
ing, like the Supreme Court, the truth of empirical evidence that
death-qualified juries are more conviction-prone than
186 Some of the data presented to the Supreme Court in Lockhart is
summarized in Grigsby v. Mabry, 569 F. Supp. 1273, 1290-304 (E.D. Ark.
1983), aff'd, 758 F.2d 226 (8th Cir. 1985) (en banc), revd sub nom Lockhart v.
McCree, 476 U.S. 162 (1986); see also Lockhart, 476 U.S. at 202-03 (Marshall,
J., dissenting); State v. Young, 853 P.2d 327, 388-93 (Utah 1993) (Durham, J.,
dissenting). Death-qualified juries are more punitive than those juries on which
opponents of capital punishment are allowed to sit. Death-qualified jurors are
substantially more likely to convict or to convict of more serious charges. They
are also "more likely to believe that a defendant's failure to testify is indicative
of his guilt, more hostile to the insanity defense, more mistrustful of defense
attorneys, and less concerned about the danger of erroneous convictions."
Lockhart, 476 U.S. at 187. (Marshall, J., dissenting). Moreover, "[b]y focusing
on the penalty before the trial actually begins. . . the judge, the prosecutor, and
the defense counsel convey the impression that they all believe the defendant is
guilty, that the 'real' issue is the appropriate penalty, and that the defendant
really deserves the death penalty." Grigsby, 569 F. Supp. at 1303.
117 476 U.S. 162 (1986).
"ss See, e.g., Alvarez, 872 P.2d at 454-55, 462; State v. Ramseur, 524 A.2d
188, 250-54, 295-300, 344-48 (N.J. 1987); Maxwell, 477 A.2d at 1318-22.
189 524 A.2d 188 (N.J. 1987).
190 Id. at 250-54.
91 Id. at 252.
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nondeath-qualifiedjuries, the Ramseur majority nonetheless rejected
the impartial-jury argument, citing the Supreme Court's conclusion
that "if the Constitution required a certain mix of individual
viewpoints, i.e., those less or more prone to convict on a particular
jury, then courts would be required to undertake the difficult task
of balancing each jury."' 92 Given the state's "entirely proper
interest in obtaining a single jury that could impartially decide all
of the issues, ' the balance is struck against the defendant's
claim. Moreover, the Ramseur majority was convinced that there
was "no satisfactory alternative to death qualification ofjurors prior
to the guilt phase."' 94
However, the New Jersey court expressed concern in Ramseur
about another aspect of Lockhart; namely, the Supreme Court's
rejection of the petitioner's argument that death qualification
deprived him of his right to a jury representing a fair cross-section
of the community. 95 In Lockhart, the Court reasoned that consci-
entious objectors to the death penalty are not "a distinctive group
in the community," unlike "women and racial minorities," which
are "groups previously recognized as distinctive" for Sixth
Amendment purposes. 196 The New Jersey court was troubled by
evidence cited by the federal court overruled in Lockhart, "evidence
establish[ing] that one consistent and inevitable result of the death
qualification process is the disproportionate exclusion of blacks and
women."' 97 The Ramseur majority continued:
We have before us no evidence that in New Jersey there
has been a resultant systematic exclusion of blacks and
women in disproportionate numbers. We recently expressed
our disdain for the systematic exclusion of distinctive
groups because of our special commitment to the fair
cross-section requirement. Therefore, if data relevant to the
New Jersey practice are presented to us indicating such a
192 Id. at 251 (citing Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162, 178-79 (1986)).
'9 Id. (quoting Lockhart, 476 U.S. at 180).
194 Id. at 253.
191 476 U.S. 162, 174 (1986).
196 Id. at 174-77.
197 Ramseur, 524 A.2d at 252 n.54 (quoting Grigsby v. Mabry, 569 F. Supp.
1273, 1283 (E.D. Ark. 1983)).
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result, we would be prepared to address this constitutional
concern. 1
98
Justice Handler dissented from the majority's conclusion that
death qualification does not violate the right to an impartial
jury.'99 Although he questioned the logic of Lockhart, his major
disagreement involved the majority's failure to "construe the New
Jersey Constitution as an independent source of protection. "200
Justice Handler argued that:
The balance this Court makes under our Constitution must
be different from that made by the United States Supreme
Court.... First, the right to be tried by an impartial jury
is given great protection under our state standards and
under our State Constitution.. . . Second, under the state
doctrine of fundamental fairness, that right to an impartial
jury must be applied even more strictly when life is at
stake.20
1
Given his greater interest in impartiality, and his conviction that the
practical problem can be solved without imposing any substantial
burden on the state-by using two separate juries or by death-
qualifying the jury after the guilt phase and replacing non-death-
qualified jurors with alternate jurors2 2 -Justice Handler con-
cluded that New Jersey's death qualification procedure "violates
198 Id.; see also Grigsby v. McCree, 758 F.2d 226 (8th Cir. 1985) (en banc),
rev'd sub nom, Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162 (1986). In Grisby, the court
stated:
Blacks and women constitute significant and distinctive groups ofjury-
eligible citizens within Arkansas and the Nation. Death qualification
results in their systematic disproportionate removal from juries which
try the guilt-innocence of persons accused of capital crimes, without
adequate justification, in violation of the accused's right to a repre-
sentative jury comprised of a fair cross-section of the community.
Id. at 231 n.9.
"' Ramseur, 524 A.2d at 300 (Handler, J., dissenting).
200 Id. at 346-47 (Handler, J., dissenting).
20 Id. at 347 (Handler, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
202 Id. at 348 (Handler, J., dissenting); see also Lockhart, 476 U.S. at 203-05
(Marshall, J., dissenting); Grigsby, 569 F. Supp. at 1319.
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State constitutional guarantees of a fair and impartial jury as a
matter of fundamental fairness.,
20 3
In his Ramseur concurrence, Justice Daniel O'Hern also rejected
the death qualification process, but on different grounds. 0 4 He
found it unnecessary to decide whether the New Jersey Constitution
provides more protection than the Federal Constitution. Rather, he
would have held that "in the exercise of our judicial supervision
over the criminal justice system, continuing to death-qualify juries
at the guilt phase ... is inconsistent with New Jersey's traditional
sense of fairness and justice."20 5
Justice O'Hern summarized Lockhart as holding "that it is all
right to determine a defendant's guilt by a jury more prone to
convict than by a jury representative of a cross-section of the
community. 2 6 He continued:
The Court permits that result because it believes that the
State is entitled to have jurors in the penalty phase who
will conscientiously apply the laws of the State. The Court
extends this entitlement to the guilt phase, not because it
believes that such a trial produces a fairer verdict, but
because it does not believe in the limited exercise of its
constitutional supervision over state criminal trials it should
impose upon the states the burden of empaneling a penalty-
phase jury if the guilt-phase jury cannot sit to resolve the
penalty. ... I recognize that the added burdens are real
and are not insubstantial, but I believe they are ones that
society would be willing to make to preserve the central
value of our criminal justice system-trial by an impartial
jury, not one that is more prone to convict. 20 7
Finally, Justice O'Hern articulated the doctrinal basis of his
conclusion, in more abstract terms, as follows:
It is the Supreme Court's function to define the limits of
what states can do, not what they should do. Focusing on
203 Ramseur, 524 A.2d at 348.
24 Id. at 294 (O'Hern, J., concurring).
20 Id. at 295 (O'Hern, J., concurring).
206 Id. (O'Hern, J., concurring).
207 Id. at 296 (O'Hern, J., concurring).
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the outer limits of state power averts attention from the
inner question: what is the proper exercise of criminal
procedure? The real question for us is not what the state
can do, but rather what we should do in the just exercise
of our common law supervisory power over criminal
practice within our jurisdiction.0 8
The Ramseur opinions suggest several different kinds of
challenges to New York's death qualification procedure, which is
very similar to New Jersey's.20 9 First, there is the argument that
Lockhart is simply wrong, illogical and contradictory of the
Supreme Court's own precedent.10 Second, if special New York
concern for impartial juries and juries representative of a fair cross-
section of the community can be demonstrated by historical and
social-scientific evidence, then it can be argued that the state
constitution provides more protection than the Federal
Constitution.2 1' Finally, death qualification can be challenged
208 Id. at 295 (O'Hern, J., concurring). Put another way, the reach of
constitutional norms is often much greater than the Supreme Court's institutional
grasp. See generally Lawrence G. Sager, Fair Measure: The Legal Status of
Underenforced Norms, 91 HARV. L. REv. 1212 (1978).
209 However, it must be noted that New York's statute also provides for the
removal for cause of potential jurors whose "conscientious opinions" in favor of
the death penalty will interfere with their ability to render an impartial verdict
or properly exercise sentencing discretion. Death Penalty Act § 15, 1995 N.Y.
LAWS at 5 (amending N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 270.20(1)(f) (McKinney 1993)).
In 1992, the Supreme Court held that a capital defendant must be permitted to
challenge for cause any prospective juror who would automatically vote for the
death penalty. Morgan v. Illinois, 504 U.S. 719 (1992). One state supreme court
has assumed that such "life-qualifying" challenges provide some "counter-
balancing" to death qualification. State v. Moore, 697 P.2d 233, 237 (Utah
1985). Yet there seems to be no empirical evidence of any counter-balancing. In
fact, recent studies "continue to show a statistically significant likelihood that
death qualification frequently will produce conviction-prone juries regardless of
any counter-balancing effect of excluding" jurors who would automatically vote
for the death penalty. State v. Young, 853 P.2d 327, 387 (Durham, J.,
dissenting). Much work remains to be done if the troubling puzzle of death
qualification is to be solved.
2 0 Ramseur, 524 A.2d at 320 (Handler, J., dissenting),
21 Id. at 209 (citing California v. Ramos, 463 U.S. 992 (1983), and noting
that in capital cases "[i]t is elementary that States are free to provide greater
209
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without challenging the Supreme Court's reasoning or finding
interpretive or noninterpretive reasons for more constitutional
protection. Instead, death qualification can be challenged under
Justice O'Hern's can-should rationale." 2 According to Justice
O'Hern's analysis, the Supreme Court decides the outer limits of
state power; whether on the basis of their supervisory power or
under their own constitutions, state courts decide not whether to
give the same or more protection, but the proper exercise of
power.213
There are still other potential challenges to death qualification,
however. For example, challenges can also be based on the state
constitutional guarantee of the free exercise of religion.2"4 This
argument maintains that the prospective jurors' rights to religious
freedom are violated when they are excluded from service on
capital juries solely because their religious beliefs forbid the
imposition of the death penalty.
Finally, it can be argued that an innocent defendant who faces
trial on a capital charge before what the state itself concedes to be
a conviction-prone jury may have no choice but to accept whatever
plea bargain is offered. Even accepting, for argument's sake, that
a defendant can otherwise enter such a plea voluntarily, surely it
can be argued that the specter of a conviction-prone jury tips the
constitutional balance, violating state constitutional guarantees of
due process and against compelled self-incrimination.
3. Assistance of Counsel
The single feature that characterizes almost every case in which
the death penalty has been imposed is the abysmal quality of
representation that the defendant received. In no other area of the
protections in their criminal justice system than the Federal Constitution
requires").
212 Id. at 295 (O'Hern, J. concurring).
213 Put another way, state courts may properly give life to under-enforced
norms. See Bilionis, supra note 89, at 1684-85.
214 The New York Constitution provides that "[t]he free exercise and
enjoyment of religious profession and worship ... shall forever be allowed in
this state to all mankind." N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 3.
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law does one read as many accounts of incompetent, unethical,
lazy, negligent, racist attorneys providing inadequate representation
to the invariably indigent capital defendant.215 Indeed, Stephen B.
Bright, the director of the Southern Center for Human Rights in
Atlanta and one of the most experienced death penalty litigators in
the country, entitled his recent essay in the Yale Law Journal,
Counsel for the Poor: The Death Sentence Not for the Worst Crime
but for the Worst Lawyer.1 6
Bright identifies a number of reasons that the defendants most
in need of the best representation regularly receive the worst.
Foremost among these is the fact that "the compensation provided
to individual court-appointed lawyers is so minimal that few
accomplished lawyers can be enticed to defend capital cases. Those
who do take a capital case cannot afford to devote the time
required to defend it properly., 21 7 Prosecutors, on the other hand,
are generally well-funded.
A related reason for poor capital representation is that the
attorneys assigned to represent indigents rarely handle death penalty
cases regularly and therefore lack the expertise, even if they possess
the funds and the desire to do a competent job. Prosecutors, on the
other hand, have established death penalty bureaus in their offices
staffed by attorneys who do nothing else but capital prosecutions
and who are, consequently, experts in their field.
Ultimately, Bright points out, it is the judiciary that is largely
to blame for the ineffective assistance of counsel that indigent
capital defendants routinely receive because the standard set by the
Supreme Court for judging lawyers' competence is so low. 218
Moreover, at the same time that the courts have lowered the
standards for effective representation, they have raised the proce-
dural requirements for challenging trial errors on appeal. Thus,
courts find that attorneys have provided effective representation,
even where they neglect to move for relief or to raise objections at
trial, thus forfeiting appellate review of reversible errors.
215 Stephen B. Bright, Counsel for the Poor: The Death Sentence Not for the
Worst Crime but for the Worst Lawyer, 103 YALE L.J. 1835 (1994).
216 id.
211 Id. at 1844.
218 Id. at 1843, 1857-58.
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The question, therefore, is whether the pattern of inadequate
representation of capital defendants in other states will repeat itself
in New York and, if it does, how the court of appeals will respond.
It is, of course, an article of faith for New Yorkers that few things
that happen in the Deep South could ever happen in their state.
Moreover, it is clear that the drafters of New York's death penalty
statute intended that capital defendants should receive adequate
representation. Nevertheless, there is cause for concern, for even
where the desire to provide such representation exists, it may
simply be beyond the ability of the state to provide it.
Under section 29 of the New York death penalty statute,
defendants who are unable to afford representation are entitled to
the appointment of two attorneys from the time they are charged
with first degree murder (or from the time that the district attorney
informs the court that the prosecutor's office is investigating
whether a defendant charged with second degree murder can or
should be charged with first degree murder) through sentenc-
ing. 1 9 Once a court sentences a defendant to death, one and
possibly two lawyers will be assigned to handle the appeal.22 ° In
addition, a convicted capital defendant is entitled to representation
by appointed counsel on one, and only one, collateral proceeding
under sections 440.10 or 440.20 of the Criminal Procedure Law,
and on appeal from any order denying an initial post-judgment
motion pursuant to one of those sections. 22' Additionally, the
defendant is entitled to investigative, expert and other "reasonably
necessary" services.222
On its face, the New York statute provides capital defendants
with representation at more stages than the Supreme Court requires
under the Federal Constitution. Assignment of counsel to indigent
defendants at trial and on appeal is, of course, guaranteed by the
219 Death Penalty Act § 29, 1995 N.Y. LAWS at 15-19 (amending the
Judiciary Law by adding a new § 35-b).
220 Id.
221 N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 440.10 (McKinney 1994); Death Penalty Act
§ 21, 1995 N.Y. LAWS at 2 (amending N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 440.20(1)
(McKinney 1994)).
222 Death Penalty Act § 29, 1995 N.Y. LAWS at 15-19 (amends the Judiciary
Law by adding a new § 35-b).
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Sixth Amendment. In Murray v. Giarratano,223 however, the
Supreme Court held that the Federal Constitution does not require
the state to appoint counsel for indigent prisoners seeking state
post-conviction relief. The requirement of "a greater degree of
reliability" in death penalty cases applies only to "the trial stage of
capital offense adjudication where the court and jury hear testi-
mony, receive evidence and decide questions of guilt and punish-
ment. 12 4 Thus, the Court contrasted the trial stage of a criminal
proceeding with the appellate stage, at which the defendant "needs
an attorney not as a shield to protect him against being 'haled into
court' by the State and stripped of his presumption of innocence,
but rather as a sword to upset the prior determination of guilt. 2 25
Nevertheless, a serious challenge could be raised under the state
constitution in the appropriate case to the denial of assigned
counsel to a capital defendant on a subsequent collateral proceed-
ing.226 In Murray, dissenting Justices Stevens, joined by Justices
Brennan, Marshall and Blackmun noted that while
[i]deally, direct appeal is the primary avenue for review of
a conviction or sentence, and death penalty cases are no
exception ... significant evidence [exists to show that] in
capital cases what is ordinarily considered direct review
does not sufficiently safeguard against miscarriages of
justice to warrant this presumption of finality.227
Justice Stevens pointed to the fact that federal habeas corpus relief
was granted in only 0.25% to 7% of noncapital cases in recent
years while the success rate in capital cases ranged from 60% to
70%.22 He concluded that "[s]uch a high incidence of uncor-
rected error demonstrates that the meaningful appellate review
necessary in a capital case extends beyond the direct appellate
process. "229 The statute in Murray provided no counsel for
223 492 U.S. 1 (1989).
224 Id. at 9.
225 Id. at 7-9 (quoting Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600, 610-11 (1974)).
226 Id. at 23 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
227 Id. at 23 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
228 Id. at 23-24 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
229 Id. at 24 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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collateral review.23 ° Still, it is difficult to see why a capital
defendant who has already exhausted his one collateral proceeding
should be denied counsel subsequently to raise, for example, a
well-founded claim of newly discovered evidence. Certainly an
argument could be made, in the appropriate case, that the failure to
provide a capital defendant with counsel in such a situation violates
the state constitution.
Even if the court of appeals holds that the statute adequately
provides for counsel at all crucial stages, the problem of ensuring
that the counsel provided is competent will still remain. As Stephen
B. Bright points out, the main cause of inadequate representation
is insufficient money.231 While the legislature appears to intend
to provide adequate funding for capital defense, the fact is that it
is unlikely that it will be able to do so because capital represen-
tation, properly performed, is extremely costly.
In a recent article, Judge Joseph Bellacosa, of the New York
Court of Appeals, gives several examples of death penalty cases
which required years of litigation until sentences were finally
vacated.232 In one Mississippi case, the New York law firm Cahill
Gordon & Reindel, represented the defendant.23 3 The law firm's
fee was $1.7 million dollars.2 34 In another case, the attorneys of
an inmate of Arizona's death row spent over $2 million dollars in
lawyer hours and $100,000.00 in out-of-pocket expenses.2 35 Judge
230 VA. CODE ANN. § 14.1-183 (Michie 1993). The Virginia statute provides
that:
Any person, who is a resident of this Commonwealth, who, on account
of his poverty is unable to pay fees or costs may be allowed by a court
to sue or defend a suit therein, without paying fees or costs; whereupon
he shall have, from any counsel whom the court may assign him, and
from all officers, all needful services and process, without any fees to
the therefor, except what may be included in the costs recovered from
the opposite party.
Id.
23' Bright, supra note 215, at 1843-44.
232 Bellacosa, supra note 5, at 3.
233 Bellacosa,supra note 5, at 8 (discussing Johnson v. Mississippi, 486 U.S.
578 (1988)).
234 Bellacosa, supra note 5, at 10.
235 Bellacosa, supra note 5, at 16.
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Bellacosa's point was not that these sums were excessive, but rather
that this is what competent representation can cost.
236
While the New York Legislature clearly understood that it
would have to provide additional funding for capital representation,
it remains unclear whether the courts can or will reimburse defense
attorneys for the hours that they actually must spend to defend
capital cases, and whether the courts can or will reimburse the
necessary expenses incurred during investigation and prepa-
ration 237 at rates that will enable good attorneys to handle the
case.238 If New York, like so many other states, cannot pay the
going rate for top-level representation, serious claims of inadequate
assistance of counsel will surely result.
Indeed, not only does the experience of other states compel this
conclusion, 239 but it is consistent with the experience in New
York in noncapital cases. Only a few highly competent attorneys
in New York City regularly handle assigned cases because the
reimbursement rate in noncapital cases is extremely low. And,
indeed, a very low standard of competence is tolerated by the
courts from assigned counsel in serious criminal cases carrying
heavy penalties.
When death penalty cases reach the New York Court of
Appeals, the question will be whether the court will do as the
federal and other state courts have done and simply lower the
standard of competence to the level of payment, or whether it will
require the state to pay for justice in death penalty cases. At a time
236 Bellacosa, supra note 5, at 15-16.
237 As of this writing, negotiations are going on between the Capital
Defender Office, which was established to oversee the defense of capital cases,
and the comptroller over how lawyers representing capital defendants will be
paid. The Capital Defender Office was allotted $4.5 million in the current state
budget with just $250,000.00 of that earmarked to pay attorneys handling capital
cases. It is unclear what will happen when the $250,000.00 runs out. Daniel
Wise, Four Panels Named for Death Penalty Cases; Assignments Include
Counsel Compensation, N.Y.L.J., Aug. 16, 1995, at 1.
... A commentator involved in the process of setting the compensation rates
for defenders of indigent capital defendants predicts that rates will be $125.00
per hour, or slightly less, for in-court work and $75.00 per hour for out-of-court
work. Id.
239 Bright, supra note 215, at 1841-44.
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when the state is required to cut essential services to New Yorkers
and lay off thousands of workers,24 ° one wonders why it should
pay millions of dollars for the prosecution and defense of persons
charged with capital crimes. The only constitutional conclusion may
be, however, that capital punishment is a luxury that the state
cannot afford.
Finally, the disparity in competence between prosecutors and
defense attorneys in capital cases is as likely to exist in New York
as in other states. New York will soon have a group of highly
skilled prosecutors handling death penalty cases, while defense
attorneys will not have the same opportunity to develop such
expertise.24' The statute does provide for the creation of a Capital
Defender Office to oversee the provision of representation in death
penalty cases.242 The Office is authorized to provide represen-
tation to capital defendants;243 to provide legal or other advice
and investigative, expert and other reasonably necessary services to
counsel appointed to represent capital defendants; 24 to enter into
an agreement with a legal aid society or other not-for-profit organi-
zation to provide representation to capital defendants;245 and to
determine minimum standards of competence for attorneys
representing capital defendants.246
While the staff of the Capital Defender Office and the Legal
Aid attorneys who work regularly on death penalty cases will no
doubt provide competent representation, most of the representation
of capital defendants is expected to be performed by private
attorneys with the help of the Capital Defender Office.247 While
some of these will be the dedicated and highly competent lawyers
who have taken on death penalty cases around the country, at great
240 See James Dao, The Pataki Budget; The Overview: Pataki Proposes
Broad Reduction in State Spending, N.Y. TiMES, Feb. 2, 1995, at Al.
241 Jan Hoffman, Lawyers Prepare for New York's Penalty, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 31, 1995, at A4.
242 Death Penalty Act § 29, 1995 N.Y. LAWS at 15-19 (amending the








personal sacrifice, the existence of such attorneys is not guaranteed.
Moreover, the death penalty statute provides that the minimum
competence of attorneys to handle death penalty cases shall be
determined "taking into consideration not just the needs of
defendants for adequate representation, but also the needs of the
state for an adequate number of attorneys., 248
Although the amount paid to attorneys assigned to represent
capital defendants is low, compared to the fees of experienced
private attorneys, the rate paid for assigned capital representation
is higher than the rate paid assigned attorneys in noncapital
cases.249 Attorneys who earn their living by handling assigned
cases may consider capital representation lucrative work. If these
attorneys know that there will ultimately be a cap on what they can
earn in such cases, however, there is a danger that they will do as
they do in noncapital cases, which is to give the cases short-shrift.
Even if some highly competent attorneys agree to take on
capital cases, as Judge Bellacosa urges them to do as part of their
ethical obligations as attorneys, few can afford to handle more than
one such case. 250 Thus, even good attorneys will have had little
experience in handling capital cases. Indeed, given that New York
has not had a death penalty for over twenty years, there are almost
no lawyers in New York with experience handling such cases. In
this situation, a great disparity can be expected between the
performance of defense counsel and the performance of prosecutors
which will inevitably result in claims of inadequate represen-
2511tation.
In sum, despite the legislature's best efforts to ensure that the
death penalty in New York will be administered fairly, we can
expect the problems that have resulted in such low quality
248 id
249 id.
250 Bellacosa, supra note 5, at 39-40.
"' In the unlikely event that an individual defendant possesses more
resources with which to defend himself or herself than the state has with which
to prosecute him or her, the statute provides that the district attorney's office can
call on the resources of the attorney general's office to balance the scales. Death
Penalty Act § 34, 1995 N.Y. LAWS at 24 (amending the Executive Law by
adding a new § 63-d).
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representation in death penalty cases throughout the country to arise
here as well. The important question, therefore, is whether the court
of appeals will find that our state constitution demands a higher
standard of attorney competence than does the Federal Constitution.
In fact, the New York Court of Appeals may be receptive to
state constitutional arguments concerning adequacy of counsel. On
a number of occasions, the court has stated that New York has a
long history of providing a higher degree of protection to the right
to counsel than is provided by the Federal Constitution." 2 For
example, in People v Harris,253 the court found that "the
Supreme Court's rule is not adequate to protect New York citizens
from Payton violations because of our right to counsel rule." '254
The court went on to describe the "protective body of law" in New
York in the area of the right to counsel under the state constitution
"which is 'far more expansive than the Federal counterpart."' 2"
Similarly, in People v Ellis, 256 the court of appeals rejected the
Strickland v Washington25 7 test for competence of counsel which
requires a defendant to show first, by overcoming a strong
presumption to the contrary, that the attorney's performance was
"not within the range of competence demanded of attorneys in
criminal cases; ' '258 and second, "that there is a reasonable proba-
bility that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the
proceeding would have been different., 259 The court of appeals
instead adopted a less stringent "totality of the circumstances" test
under which a defendant must simply show that in the
252 People v. Harris, 77 N.Y.2d 434, 439, 570 N.E.2d 1051, 1054, 568
N.Y.S.2d 702, 705 (1991); see also People v. Bing, 76 N.Y.2d 331, 558 N.E.2d
1011, 559 N.Y.S.2d 474 (1990); People v. Hobson, 39 N.Y.2d 479, 384 N.E.2d
894, 384 N.Y.S.2d 419 (1976).
253 77 N.Y.2d 434, 570 N.E.2d 1051, 568 N.Y.S.2d 702 (1991).
254 Id. at 440, 570 N.E.2d at 1054, 568 N.Y.S.2d at 705 (analyzing Payton
v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980)).
255 Id., 570 N.E.2d at 1054, 568 N.Y.S.2d at 705 (citing People v. Bing, 76
N.Y.2d 331, 338-39, 558 N.E.2d 1011, 1014, 559 N.Y.S.2d 474, 477 (1990)).
256 81 N.Y.2d 854, 613 N.E.2d 529, 597 N.Y.S.2d 623 (1993).
257 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
258 Id. at 687.
259 Id. at 694.
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circumstances of the particular case, viewed in their totality,
counsel's representation was not "meaningful. 260
In his recent article, Judge Bellacosa wrote in consternation at
the "grotesque imbalance in the scales of justice" due to the
number of death penalty cases in which representation by counsel
was inadequate, and he called on the Bar to help remedy the
situation.261 Whether or not New York lawyers respond to the
call, Judge Bellacosa's article is another indication that the court of
appeals is not prepared to tolerate the inadequate representation of
capital defendants even though such representation might pass
federal constitutional scrutiny.
An additional question related to the standard of competence
that the court of appeals will require from attorneys in death
penalty cases is what procedural requirements courts will impose
on capital defendants seeking to raise unpreserved claims on appeal.
The court might be urged to abandon its generally rigid preser-
vation requirements in capital cases. Certainly, the court has held
many times that issues involving denial of the right to counsel can
be raised for the first time on appeal.262 An argument might
therefore be constructed that because death is different, issues that
counsel failed to raise below should be considered on appeal in
capital cases.
4. Aggravating Circumstances Proven at the "Guilt Phase"
To be constitutional, a capital sentencing scheme must ensure
that the murderers who are sentenced to death are "materially more
'depraved"' than those who receive prison sentences.263 The
requirement that a jury must find at least one statutory aggravating
circumstance before recommending a death sentence is the method
260 Ellis, 81 N.Y.2d at 856, 613 N.E.2d at 503, 597 N.Y.S.2d at 624
(quoting People v. Baldi, 54 N.Y.2d 137, 147, 429 N.E.2d 400, 405, 444
N.Y.S.2d 893, 898 (1981)).
261 Bellacosa, supra note 5, at 37-38.
262 See, e.g., People v. Kinchen, 60 N.Y.2d 772, 773, 457 N.E.2d 786, 787,
469 N.Y.S.2d 680, 681 (1983); People v. Samuels, 49 N.Y.2d 218, 221, 400
N.E.2d 1344, 1345, 424 N.Y.S.2d 892, 894 (1980).
263 Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 433 (1980).
219
JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY
used to narrow the class of persons eligible for execution. In most
states, this narrowing procedure takes place during the sentencing
phase of a capital trial. That is, after a defendant has been found
guilty under a statute broadly defining murder, the jury in a
separate proceeding goes on to consider whether the murder was
one of the worst murders under legislatively determined standards
of depravity.
New York, however, is one of a minority of states that have
adopted a different system. New York's capital punishment statute
narrows the class of death-eligible defendants in the first instance
by providing restrictive definitions of first degree murder. Thus,
with two exceptions,264 the only aggravating circumstances that
the jury may consider are elements of the crime that have been
proven beyond a reasonable doubt at trial.2 65 The aggravating
factor or factors proved at trial are deemed established beyond a
reasonable doubt for purposes of sentencing and may not be
relitigated at the sentencing proceeding.2 66 Thus, a capital sentenc-
ing proceeding in New York will consist simply of the balancing
of any mitigating circumstances against the aggravating circum-
stances already found.
The constitutionality of a similar system was upheld by the
Supreme Court in Lowenfield v Phelps.267 There, the defendant
sought to vacate his sentence of death on the ground that the sole
aggravating circumstance found by the jury at the sentencing phase
of the trial was identical to an element of the capital crime of
264 The New York Criminal Procedure Law provides that in any prosecution
in which the defendant denies a previous murder conviction or remains mute,
"the people may prove that element of the offense only after the jury has first
found the defendant guilty of intentionally causing" the victim's death. Death
Penalty Act § 8, 1995 N.Y. LAWS at 3 (amending N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW
§ 200.60(3)(b) (McKinney 1993)). Section 400.27(7)(a) of the New York
Criminal Procedure Law permits the prosecution to prove one additional
aggravating circumstance at the sentencing phase-that the killing was committed
in an "act of terrorism." Death Penalty Act § 20, 1995 N.Y. LAWS at 6-12
(amending the Criminal Procedure Law by adding a new § 400.27(7)(a)).
265 Death Penalty Act § 20, 1995 N.Y. LAWS at 6-12 (amending the Criminal
Procedure Law by adding a new § 400.27).
266 Id.
267 484 U.S. 231 (1988).
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which the defendant had been convicted.26' The defendant argued
that "this overlap left the jury at the sentencing phase free merely
to repeat one of its findings in the guilt phase, and thus not to
narrow further in the sentencing phase the class of death-eligible
murderers. '269 The Court, however, saw "no reason why [the]
narrowing function may not be performed by jury findings at either
the sentencing phase of the trial or the guilt phase, ' 270 explaining
that
the narrowing function required for a regime of capital
punishment may be provided in either of ... two ways:
The legislature may itself narrow the definition of capital
offenses, as Texas and Louisiana [and New York] have
done, so that the jury finding of guilt responds to this
concern, or the legislature may more broadly define capital
offenses and provide for narrowing by jury findings of
aggravating circumstances at the penalty phase.27'
The Court's reasoning was criticized in a dissent written by
Justice Marshall, who argued that a sentencing scheme in which an
element of the crime of which the defendant is convicted is also an
aggravating factor that justifies the imposition of the death penalty
violates two principles. 2 2 First, such a scheme violates the
principle that the discretion of the sentencer be guided by a nar-
rowing of the class of people eligible for the death penalty. Second,
it violates the principle that the sentencer be fully cognizant of its
responsibility for the imposition of a sentence of life or death are
violated by Justice Marshall wrote:
[T]he narrowing requirement is meant to channel the
discretion of the sentencer. It forces the capital sentencing
jury to approach its task in a structured, step-by-step way,
first determining whether a defendant is eligible for the
death penalty and then determining whether all of the
circumstances justify its imposition. The only conceivable
268 Id. at 241.
269 id.
270 Id. at 244-45.
271 Id. at 246.
272 Id. at 246-59 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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reason for making narrowing a constitutional requirement
is its function in structuring sentencing deliberations. By
permitting the removal of the narrowing function from the
sentencing process altogether, the Court reduces it to a
mechanical formality entirely unrelated to the choice
between life and death.273
Moreover, Justice Marshall pointed out the relegation of the
narrowing function to the guilt phase of a capital trial leads the
sentencing jurors to believe that a defendant's eligibility for a death
sentence has already been established during the guilt
phase-findings arrived at without any contemplation of their
implication for the defendant's sentence.274
Indeed, [in Lowenfield] the Court specifically instructed the
jury at the start of its guilt phase deliberations: 'You are
not to discuss, in any way, the possibility of any penalties
whatsoever.' Then, during the penalty hearing, the prose-
cutor twice reminded the jury that it had already found
during the guilt phase one of the aggravating circumstances
that the State urged was applicable to petitioner's sentence.
The prosecutor's argument might well have convinced the
jury that it had no choice about and hence no responsibility
for the defendant's eligibility for the death penalty. This
situation cannot be squared with our promise to ensure that
a capital sentencing jury recognizes the gravity of its task
and proceeds with the appropriate awareness of its 'truly
awesome responsibility.'2 75
New York's statute "tilts the sentencing scales toward the
imposition of the death penalty" 27' even more than did the
Louisiana statute at issue in Lowenfield. Under the Louisiana
statute, the jury was required to consider aggravating factors at
sentencing and thus could reconsider the overlapping factor even if
it was unlikely to do SO. 2 7 7 Under the New York statute, however,
273 Id. at 257 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
274 Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting).
275 Id. at 257-58 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
276 Id. at 258 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
277 Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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the jury is prohibited from reconsidering aggravating factors at the
sentencing phase of trial.17 ' Thus, jurors, who are instructed not
to consider the sentence at the time that they consider guilt, 279
will begin their sentencing deliberations by finding that they have
already done half the job without knowing it; aggravating factors
have already been proven and all that remains to be determined is
whether the defendant has provided any reason why he or she
should not be executed. The system is no more fair if jurors are
informed at the guilt phase of trial about the implications of their
verdict on sentencing. If given the choice between acquitting a
guilty murderer or imposing a disproportionate death sentence on
him or her, most jurors would doubtless opt for the latter course.
In sum, New York's capital sentencing scheme is designed to
result in the imposition of the death penalty by a jury that does not
understand the implications of its actions or by one that is
organized to impose a sentence of death. Given New York's long
history of providing enhanced protections to criminal defendants,
the court of appeals would have strong grounds under the state
constitution for vacating a sentence of death imposed by such a
jury.
5. Felony Murder
Only intentional murders are punishable by death under New
York's capital punishment statute. 2 0 The fact that a murder was
committed during the course of the commission of an enumerated
felony is, however, an aggravating circumstance that can justify the
27 The new statute provides that at the sentencing phase, "the only
aggravating factors that the jury may consider are those proven beyond a
reasonable doubt at trial, and no other aggravating factors may be considered."
Death Penalty Act § 20, 1995 N.Y. LAWS at 6-12 (amending the Criminal
Procedure Law by adding a new § 400.27).
279 New York juries are, in fact, routinely instructed not to consider possible
sentence in determining guilt. See Committee on Criminal Jury Instructions,
CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS OF NEW YORK § 6.30, at 255-57 (1991).
280 Death Penalty Act § 2, 1995 N.Y. LAWS at 1 (amending N.Y. PENAL
LAW § 60.06 (McKinney 1987)).
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imposition of a death sentence.2 1' Thus, while New York's statute
does not suffer from the same lack of narrowing as do the statutes
of other states that permit the execution of felony murderers who
show only reckless indifference to life, it also does not insure that
only the worst murderers are selected for execution.
Under section seven of the New York statute, in addition to
intentional felony murderers, the murderers of police officers, peace
officers, employees of correctional institutions and judges may be
executed.8 2 Additionally, defendants who have killed witnesses
to keep them from testifying, hitmen, previously convicted
murderers, terrorists and the killers of more than one person at the
same time, or more than two people in the state as part of the same
plan during the previous two years, are also eligible for the death
penalty.23 Finally, murderers who first torture their victims may
be sentenced to death.28 4 This means that the intentional murder
of most victims is not punishable by death unless the murder was
accompanied by torture or was committed during the course of
another crime.
The result of New York's scheme is likely to be the freakish
imposition of the death penalty that the Supreme Court condemned
in Furman.2" For example, a thrill-killer who fires a high-
powered rifle at cars on a highway killing one person and injuring
one hundred others would not be death eligible, nor would a
defendant who stalked his victim for months before finally killing
her. An illegal abortionist who intentionally allows a patient to
bleed to death can receive only a prison sentence.286 Susan Smith
28' Death Penalty Act § 7, 1995 N.Y. LAWS at 2-3 (amending N.Y. PENAL




285 Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
286 The recent case of a Queens obstetrician convicted of murder for letting
an abortion patient bleed to death illustrates the conflicting public opinion such
a case can raise. See Carey Goldberg, After Thousands of Abortions, Some
Questions; If Practice Makes Perfect, Is Imperfection Malpractice? Doctor in
Line of Fire Says No, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 5, 1995, at BI; Lynette Holloway, 25
Years to Life for Doctor in Woman's Death After a Bungled Abortion, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 13, 1995, at B3.
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would not have been eligible for the death penalty in New York
had she rolled only one of her children into a lake to drown.287
In contrast, a surprised burglar who becomes nervous and shoots a
returning homeowner is death eligible, as is a defendant who
simply drives his victim to another location before shooting him.
A defendant who shoots a stranger on the subway for insulting him
cannot be executed, but one who shoots a stranger for his sneakers
can. In sum, while some felony murderers may fall into the "more
materially depraved category," it is clear that many do not. The
statute, however, makes no distinctions among felony murders and
thus may, under the state constitution, fail sufficiently to narrow the
class of death eligible defendants to meet the state's constitutional
requirements of consistency and proportionality in capital sentenc-
ing.
Moreover, there is some evidence supporting the conclusion that
the inclusion of felony murder as an aggravating factor has a
disparate racial impact. In a recent article, one commentator
reported on a study in Dade County, Florida which showed that
only 8% of non-felony murders involved killers and victims of
different races, while about 45% of felony murders involved
victims and killers of different races.2 8 In 95% of these cases,
the killer was Black and the victim was White.289 Further, of all
Black defendants indicted for murdering White victims, 84% were
prosecuted under the felony murder rule.29' Finally, other studies
conclude that a Black defendant who kills a White victim during a
felony is the defendant most likely to receive a death sentence.291
27 Susan Smith, a resident of South Carolina, was arrested, tried and
convicted for murdering her two young sons. Ms. Smith confessed to rolling her
car into a lake with her children strapped inside their car seats. The jury declined
to recommend the death penalty, and instead Ms. Smith was sentenced to life in
prison. See Rick Bragg, Carolina Jury Rejects Execution for Woman Who
Drowned Sons, N.Y. TIMES, July 29, 1995, at Al; Rick Bragg, Police Say
Woman Admits to Killings as Bodies of Two Children Are Found Inside Her Car,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 4, 1994, at Al.
28 Richard A. Rosen, Felony Murder and the Eighth Amendment
Jurisprudence of Death, 31 B.C. L. REv. 1103, 1117 (1990).
289 Id.
290 Id. at 1117.
291 Id. at 1118-19.
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The author of the article points out that there may be many
reasons justifying the disparity.29 2 Nevertheless, the inclusion of
felony murder in a capital sentencing statute "does allow a large,
racially skewed group of defendants ... to be convicted of first
degree murder and thus to be potentially eligible for the death
penalty., 293 The New York statute, of course, provides for pro-
portionality review by the court of appeals.294 The inclusion of
felony murder in the statute, however, makes it inevitable that the
issue of proportionality will be problematic.
6. Prior Murder Conviction as Aggravating Factor
The death penalty may be imposed on a defendant convicted of
murder in New York if, prior to the killing, the defendant has been
convicted of second degree murder 295 or has been convicted in
another jurisdiction of an offense which, if committed in New York
would constitute a violation of either Penal Law sections 125.25 or
125.27.296 The prior murder can have occurred at any time, and
292 Id. at 1117.
293 Id. at 1120.
294 Death Penalty Act § 27.30, 1995 N.Y. LAWS at 13-14 (amending N.Y.
CRiM. PROC. LAW § 470.30 (McKinney 1994)).
295 N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.25 (McKinney 1987 & Supp. 1995).
296 Death Penalty Act § 7, 1995 N.Y. LAWS at 2-3 (amending N.Y. PENAL
LAW § 125.27(1) (McKinney 1987)). Section 125.25 of the New York Penal Law
states that a person is guilty of murder in the second degree when:
1. With intent to cause the death of another person, he causes the
death of such person or of a third person ... ; or
2. Under circumstances evincing a depraved indifference to human
life, he recklessly engages in conduct which creates a grave risk of
death to another person, and thereby causes the death of another
person; or
3. Acting either alone or with one or more other persons, he
commits or attempts to commit robbery, burglary, kidnapping, arson,
rape in the first degree, sodomy in the first degree, sexual abuse in the
first degree, aggravated sexual abuse, escape in the first degree, or
escape in the second degree, and, in the course of and in furtherance
of such crime or of immediate flight therefrom, he, or another
participant, if there be any, causes the death of another person other
than one of the participants ... ; or
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it is not necessary that it have been committed after the effective
date of the death penalty statute to be considered an aggravating
factor justifying the imposition of the death penalty.297 A princi-
pled argument can be made that this section applied to a defendant
whose previous crime predated the enactment of the statute violates
the Ex Post Facto Clause because it alters the legal consequences
of the prior conviction to the defendant's detriment.
The court of appeals rejected a similar ex post facto argument
when it was raised in the context of a challenge to the Second
Violent Felony Law and the Persistent Violent Felony Law which
both reclassified certain felonies as violent and then provided for
enhanced punishment of a defendant who had previously been
convicted of those violent felonies. 298 In response to the argument
that this scheme violated the Ex Post Facto Clause when applied to
defendants whose prior convictions predated the law, the court held
that "a sentence as a multiple offender 'is not to be viewed as
either a new jeopardy or additional penalty for the earlier crimes.
It is a stiffened penalty for the latest crime, which is considered to
be an aggravated offense because a repetitive one."'
299
The court's reasoning may be less persuasive, however, where
the penalty for the latest crime is stiffened to death. The fact that
death is different certainly could cause the New York Court of
Appeals to reconsider the issue in the new context.
7. Execution of the Mentally Retarded
The New York death penalty statute provides that a capital
4. Under circumstances evincing a depraved indifferenceto human
life, and being [18] years old or more the defendant recklessly engages
in conduct which creates a grave risk of serious physical injury or
death to another person less than [ 11 ] years old and thereby causes the
death of such person.
N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.25.
297 Id.
298 People v. Morse, 62 N.Y.2d 205, 465 N.E.2d 12, 476 N.Y.S.2d 505
(1984), appeal dismissed, Vega v. New York, 469 U.S. 1186 (1985).
299 Id. at 217-18, 465 N.E.2d at 17, 476 N.Y.S.2d at 510 (quoting Gryger
v. Burke, 334 U.S. 728, 732 (1948)).
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defendant's mental retardation shall be considered as a mitigating
circumstance at the sentencing proceeding. °° In the event that a
death sentence is imposed, however, the court shall, in most cases,
render a finding with respect to whether the defendant is mentally
retarded and, if it finds this to be the case, shall set aside the
sentence of death.30' If a defendant is convicted of first degree
murder for a killing committed while he or she was incarcerated in
either a state or local correctional facility or institution, however,
the court may not set aside a death sentence on the ground of
mental retardation.30 2 In short, the New York statute prohibits the
execution of mentally retarded persons except those who kill while
they are in custody.
The Supreme Court has held that the execution of a mentally
retarded person does not necessarily violate the Federal
Constitution. In Penry v Lynaugh, °3 the Supreme Court upheld
the death sentence of a defendant suffering from what the defense
psychiatrist diagnosed as "organic brain damage and moderate
retardation, which resulted in poor impulse control and an inability
to learn from experience. 30 4 The Court rejected Penry's claim
that it would be cruel and unusual punishment, prohibited by the
Eighth Amendment, to execute a mentally retarded person who had
the reasoning capacity of a seven-year-old. 305 The Court con-
cluded that while "the common law prohibition against punishing
'idiots' for their crimes suggests that it may indeed be 'cruel and
unusual punishment' to execute persons who are profoundly or
severely retarded and wholly lacking in the capacity to appreciate
the wrongfulness of their actions, ' '3°6 not all mentally retarded
people "inevitably lack the cognitive, volitional and moral capacity
to act with the degree of culpability associated with the death
300 Death Penalty Act § 20, 1995 N.Y. LAWS at 6-12 (amending the Criminal
Procedure Law by adding a new § 400.27).
301 id.
302 Id
303 492 U.S. 302 (1989).
304 Id. at 308.
305 Id. at 340.
306 Id. at 333.
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penalty."3 7 Therefore, the Federal Constitution requires only that
sentencers be able to consider mental retardation as a mitigating
circumstance." 8 This holding was based on the Court's belief that
"[w]hile a national consensus against execution of the mentally
retarded may someday emerge reflecting the 'evolving standards of
decency that mark the progress of a maturing society,' there is
insufficient evidence of such a consensus today."3 9
At least one state court has taken the opinion in Penry as an
invitation to rely on its own state constitution in deciding how
much protection should be afforded to mentally retarded capital
defendants. The Georgia Supreme Court, in Fleming v Zant,
310
considered the issue and concluded that regardless of the national
consensus, "objective evidence indicates that a consensus against
execution of the mentally retarded does exist among
Georgians., 3
11
If the argument is accepted that a similar consensus exists
among New Yorkers that the New York Constitution prohibits the
execution of mentally retarded persons, and the statute's general
prohibition indicates that it does, 312 then it is difficult to see on
what principled basis the execution of retarded persons who commit
their crimes while in custody can be tolerated. Moreover, even if
the execution of a mentally retarded person serving a life sentence
could be defended on utilitarian grounds, New York's statute
precludes judicial determination of the appropriateness of the
execution of a mentally retarded person who kills while in the local
lock-up on a disorderly conduct charge or in pretrial detention.313
It seems likely that the court of appeals might well find such a
result unacceptable under the state constitution.
307 Id. at 338.
308 Id. at 337.
309 Id. at 340.
310 386 S.E.2d 339 (Ga. 1989).
3' Id. at 342.
312 Death Penalty Act § 20(9)(B), 1995 N.Y. LAWS at 13 (amending the
Criminal Procedure Law by adding a new § 400.27).
"' Death Penalty Act § 20(12)(D), 1995 N.Y. LAWS at 15 (amending the
Criminal Procedure Law by adding a new § 400.27).
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8. The Lethal Injection Paradox
New York's new capital punishment legislation prescribes death
by lethal injection." 4 At first glance, this change from a more
gruesome means of execution-electrocution-to a less gruesome
means seems unassailable. But second thought uncovers principled
and troubling objections arising from the new death penalty
provisions of the Corrections Law.
There are two major kinds of objection here: objections that
arise under the state constitutional prohibition of cruel and unusual
punishment,3"5 and objections that arise out of what has been
called the "medicalization" of execution.3"6 These two kinds of
objections exist in a particularly vexing relationship to each other:
the more a lethal injection statute seeks to avoid one kind of
objection, the more it gives rise to the other.
The first argument that might be raised under the state
constitution's guarantee against excessive punishment is that despite
its humane image, lethal injection does indeed inflict needless
suffering.317 Although lethal injection may be less disturbing for
on-lookers, electrocution in fact kills faster and painlessly if done
correctly."8 Moreover, the preparation for lethal injection can
34 Death Penalty Act § 32, 1995 N.Y. LAWS at 20-24 (repealing N.Y.
CORRECT. LAW art. 22-B (McKinney 1987 & Supp. 1995) and amending N.Y.
CORRECT. LAW by adding a new Article 22-B, § 658 which calls for the
injection of "a substance or substances in lethal quantity").
35 N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 5.
316 See, e.g., Karen Ross Demers, The Medicalization of the Death Penalty,
in WOODROW WILSON SCH. OF PUB. & INT'L AFF., POLICY CONFERENCE FINAL
REPORT: A DECADE OF CAPITAL PUNISHMENT IN NEW JERSEY 355 (1992). The
Policy Conference Final Report was submitted to the New Jersey Assembly
Judiciary Committee and the New Jersey Senate Judiciary Committee in March,
1992.
3' When last it spoke to the issue, concluding that electrocution did not
violate the state prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment, the court of appeals
ruled that only a means of execution involving "the possible risk of torture and
unnecessary pain" would violate that provision. People v. Kemmler, 119 N.Y.
569, 577, 24 N.E. 6, 8 (1890), affirmed by In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436 (1890).
318 Demers, supra, note 316, at 370 (noting that a specialist in brain electro-
physiology suggests that electrocution destroys brain cells in thousandths of a
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involve lengthy and painful probing to find and insert the intra-
venous line into a patent vein.319
In addition, lethal injection can involve, indeed has involved,
horrendous suffering when the execution equipment fails or when
the complex procedure is performed by a person with insufficient
skills.320 Whether the former danger is a significant one will
depend on which of the available "execution machines" New York
uses and how it is maintained; the latter danger, however, inheres
in New York's use of "execution technicians., 32' The statute is
silent as to the selection, training and qualifications of these
persons-indeed, it is silent as to everything about them except that
their identity shall never be disclosed.322
Physicians' ethics forbid them to participate in executions or to
supervise those who carry them out.323 Ethical considerations
similarly restrict the participation of nurses and other health
professionals. 324 Thus, execution technicians will be persons
without medical training unless medically trained personnel
volunteer to violate their profession's ethical commands or are
coerced into doing so. Insufficient training creates a greater risk of
painful or botched executions.325
second and that beheading may be faster).
3'9 Demers, supra note 316, at 369.
320 Demers, supra note 316, at 368-69. Although "lethal injection" sounds
simple, like a flu shot, it is in fact complex. It requires not only starting an
intravenous line, but also properly mixing and administering a combination of
drugs. Demers, supra note 316, at 368-69.
321 Death Penalty Act § 32, 1995 N.Y. LAWS at 20-24 (repealing N.Y.
CORRECT. LAW art. 22-B (McKinney 1987 & Supp. 1995) and amending the
New York Correction Law by adding a new Article 22-B).
322 Id.
323 THE AMERICAN COLLEGE OF PHYSICIANS, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, THE
NATIONAL COALITION TO ABOLISH THE DEATH PENALTY, PHYSICIANS FOR
HuMAN RIGHTS, BREACH OF TRUST: PHYSICIAN PARTICIPATION IN EXECUTIONS
IN THE UNITED STATES 13-15 (1994) [hereinafter BREACH OF TRUST].
324 Id. at 14.
325 Demers, supra note 316, at 369. Delaware's lethal injection statute was
challenged on the ground that it failed to provide appropriate guidelines for the
selection and training of execution technicians. The Delaware Supreme Court
rejected this argument on the grounds that the statute delegated the development
of execution procedures to the Department of Corrections, and that, in any case,
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Finally, although humane and anesthetic execution methods
figure large in the marketing of the death penalty, New York's
statute on its face contains no requirement that death be as swift
and painless as possible. It provides only that "[t]he punishment of
death shall be inflicted by lethal injection; that is, by the intra-
venous injection of a substance or substances in a lethal quantity
into the body of a person convicted until such person is dead. 32
6
On its face, the statute would countenance death by injection of
corrosive lye or rat poison, or by a slow drip of arsenic. A
common-sense argument can be made that such a statute does not
adequately protect against cruel and unusual punishment.
Yet the flaws in the statute were undoubtedly not introduced by
drafters who were incompetent or sadistic. Rather, what can be seen
as unsatisfactory or even unconstitutional vagueness most probably
arises from the attempt to avoid another whole category of
objections, objections that are inherent in the medicalization of
execution. There are two kinds: (1) ethical objections to the
participation of medical professionals in executions, and (2)
objections to lethal injection itself as "a corruption and exploitation
of the healing profession's role in society. "327
As to the purely ethical objections, the medical profession is
seemingly unanimous. The position of the American Medical
Association ("AMA"), as articulated in the Code of Medical Ethics,
previous executions had shown these procedures to be "reliable." State v.
Deputy, 644 A.2d 411,420 (Del. 1994). In contrast, New York's statute contains
no such delegation to the Department of Corrections, which is charged only with
providing and maintaining a "suitable and efficient" facility containing the
"apparatus and equipment necessary for the carrying out of executions by lethal
injection." Death Penalty Act § 32, 1995 N.Y. LAWS at 20-24 (repealing N.Y.
CORRECT. LAW art. 22-B (McKinney 1987 & Supp. 1995) and amending the
Correction Law by adding a new Article 22-B). There is, of course, no evidence
as to the "reliability" of New York's execution technicians, at least not with
respect to lethal injection.
326 Death Penalty Act § 32, 1995 N.Y. LAWS at 20-24 (repealing N.Y.
CORRECT. LAW art. 22-B (McKinney 1987 & Supp. 1995) and amending the
Correction Law by adding a new Article 22-B).
327 BREACH OF TRUST, supra note 323, at 13 (citing W. J. Curran & W.
Casscells, The Ethics of Medical Participation in Capital Punishment, 302 NEW
ENG. J. MED. 226-30 (1980)).
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is that "[a] physician, as a member of a profession dedicated to
preserving life when there is hope of doing so, should not be a
participant in a legally authorized execution., 32' Guidelines
developed by the AMA Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs
define participation in execution by lethal injection to include:
* prescribing or administering tranquilizers and other
psychotropic agents and medications that are part of the
execution procedure;
* monitoring vital signs on site or remotely (including
monitoring electrocardiograms) [and thus "determining"
death];
* attending or observing an execution as a physician;
" selecting injection sites;
• starting intravenous lines as a port for a lethal injection
device;
* prescribing, preparing, administering, or supervising
injection drugs or their doses or types;
" inspecting, testing, or maintaining lethal injection
devices;
• consulting with or supervising lethal injection
personnel.329
Like that of other state statutes, the vagueness of New York's
lethal injection provision is most likely deliberate: 330 an attempt to
avoid language that would reveal lethal injection to be a medical
procedure performed by medically trained personnel using medical
equipment and drugs certified for therapeutic use.33'
328 BREACH OF TRUST, supra note 323, at 13 (citing 1992 Code of Medical
Ethics, current Opinions of the Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs of the
American Medical Association (art. 2.06)). As noted above, the ethical codes of
other medical and public health organizations also condemn participation in
executions. BREACH OF TRUST, supra note 323 at 13-14.
329 BREACH OF TRUST, supra note 323, at 15.
330 See BREACH OF TRUST, supra note 323, at 17-21. Most states' depart-
ments of correction create regulations for the infliction of death by lethal
injection. These codes, which are not always a matter of public record,
sometimes "translate" the vague statutory language into procedures that clearly
violate the AMA's ethical guidelines.
"3 The Federal Drug Administration ("FDA") has certified no drugs for use
in lethal injection. All the substances used are certified for therapeutic use. The
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The New York death penalty statute, however, has not been
sanitized of all that would conflict with the AMA guidelines.
According to the AMA guidelines, physicians may not attend or
observe executions in their professional capacity and they may not
"determine" death by monitoring vital signs, although they may
attend in a "totally nonprofessional capacity" and they may
"certify" death after it has been "determined. 33 2 In contrast, New
York's Correction Law now provides that
a licensed physician or physicians may be present at the
execution .... Immediately after the execution an exami-
nation of the body of the convicted person shall be made
by the licensed physicians present at the execution and
their report in writing stating the nature of the examination
and occurrence of death shall be annexed333
to a certificate filed by the Commissioner of Corrections.3
Although the physicians' presence is initially permissive-they may
be present-it becomes clear in section 661 that physicians are to
be present in their professional capacity and that their presence is
in fact required.335 Moreover, it is not entirely clear whether the
physician's involvement is in certifying or in determining death.
Thus, on its face the statute may require participation that violates
the AMA guidelines in at least two important respects.
Finally, many doctors and health professionals object to lethal
injection because, statutory language notwithstanding, it uses
argument has been made-unsuccessfully-thatFDA regulations "preempt" state
approval of execution substances. See Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821 (1985).
The FDA itself has declined to take any action, and its exercise of discretion has
been upheld by the Supreme Court. Id. at 828-38. Opponents of lethal injection
point out that the FDA certifies drugs for veterinary use, to insure that when
animals are put down the procedure is painless. Cf Stephen G. Wood,
Regulation, Deregulation and Re-regulation: An American Perspective, 1987
B.Y.U. L. REv. 381, 435-37 (1987).
332 BREACH OF TRUST, supra note 323, at 15-16.
... Death Penalty Act § 32, 1995 N.Y. LAWS at 20-24 (repealing N.Y.
CORRECT. LAW art. 22-B (McKinney 1987 & Supp. 1995) and amending the





medical procedures designed to serve life to extinguish life.336
Further, in their view, cynicism and deception compound the
wrong: "state legislatures have been less concerned with easing the
sufferings of those put to death than with reducing opposition to
the death penalty by giving it the appearance of clinical practice
and making it seem humane." '337 This concern on the part of the
medical profession is tragically well grounded in history. It is well
established that in Nazi Germany, physician involvement in torture
and slaughter-the medicalization of cruelty-actually lulled the
consciences of many and stifled public opposition.338 Thus,
defendants accused of capital crimes may have another troubling,
principled objection to New York's "humane" means of execution.
If white coats and syringes can make genocide seem acceptable, a
fortiori, the gentle, therapeutic image of the lethal injection can
render a jury unduly willing to convict and to impose a death
sentence. It is easy to imagine how the idea of therapeutic
execution could lead a juror to forget just how different death is.
Should empirical evidence bear out this intuitive argument,
plausible state and federal challenges to the statute will exist.
In conclusion, the means of execution in New York's new death
penalty statute is not the unproblematic provision it might at first
seem. This is so because compassionate execution is, at bottom, a
paradox that defies resolution, a contradiction in terms best
summed up by the macabre term used by the New Jersey
Administrative Code to describe the substances used in lethal
injection: "execution medications., 339
CONCLUSION
In this essay, we have suggested that the potential challenges to
New York's death penalty statute are infinite, and that New York,
336 Deborah W. Denno, Is Electrocution an Unconstitutional Method of
Execution? The Engineering of Death over the Century, 35 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 551, 571-73, 619 n.467 (1994).
33' Aryeh Neier, Watching Rights, NATION, June 12, 1995, at 819; see also
Demers, supra note 316, at 357-60.
331 See ROBERT JAY LIFTON, THE NAZI DOcTORS (1986).
339 N.J. ADMIN. CODE tit. 10A, §§ 16-10.8 - 16-10.14 (1995).
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like every other state that has a death penalty, must now prepare to
spend enormous resources in the prosecution and defense of capital
cases at both the trial and appellate levels. The vast quantity of
death penalty litigation that has swamped the courts is often
portrayed as the work of those who believe that it is always
immoral and unconstitutional for the state to execute one of its
citizens. If these absolutists would stop bringing endless, frivolous
challenges to capital punishment statutes, the argument goes, the
death penalty could be administered swiftly and cheaply and two
of the major objections to its imposition would be erased.
This perception, however, is inaccurate. The endless debate in
the courts is not between those who believe that the death penalty
is immoral under any circumstances and those who believe that
what is immoral is to promise brutal killers that they will never
have to suffer the same pain that they have inflicted on their
innocent victims. The real controversy is the result of the ambiva-
lence of the proponents of capital punishment concerning the
circumstances under which they can comfortably find that a
defendant has forfeited the right to live.
For, in fact, our societal standards of decency have evolved. We
no longer string suspects up first and ask questions later. We do not
believe in torture. We temper our belief in evil with an understand-
ing of human psychology. Therefore, when we say that the majority
of our citizens want capital punishment, we must qualify the
statement by adding that the majority of those want capital
punishment only as long as they can be perfectly certain that no
innocent person will ever be executed, that racial or other discrimi-
nation did not enter into the decision to execute, that persons who
for some reason could not control or did not understand the
implications of their actions will not receive the death penalty, that
only the very worst killers will be punished by death and that the
ultimate punishment will be uniformly applied so that none of the
worst escape. Finally, they want to be confident that when a
sentence of death is carried out it is done so without inflicting pain
or humiliation on the defendant.
It is easy to see that simply making the factual determinations
necessary to fulfill these goals in an individual case requires
considerable time and expense. What makes the process more
difficult, however, is that many of our aims are contradictory.
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Thus, if we are successful in one endeavor, we fail at another. For
example, we know that if the death penalty ever deters, it does so
only when it is imposed swiftly and surely so as to leave potential
murderers in no doubt that if they are caught they will certainly be
executed. Such swift and sure punishment, however, is entirely at
odds with our desire to insure beyond all doubt that only the guilty
are executed and that the punishment fits the criminal as well as the
crime. Likewise, the belief that punishment must be individualized
results inevitably in a lack of uniformity in the meting out of death
sentences. Finally, while we abhor the spectacle of public, painful
execution, we also have qualms about doctors' participation in
sanitized, state-sponsored killings behind closed doors.
After years of trying to reconcile mutually exclusive principles
in death penalty cases, it was perhaps inevitable that the Supreme
Court and lower federal courts would finally solve the problem by
shutting their doors to capital defendants. In so doing, they have
been able to invoke countervailing principles of federalism: the
administration of capital punishment is a matter for state courts to
determine. The state courts are therefore now, in most instances,
the courts of last resort for those whom the state seeks to kill. We
suggest that the New York Court of Appeals will have no easier
time administering the death penalty than has had any other court,
for the more one studies the issue, the more one becomes con-
vinced with Justice Handler that capital punishment is a thing that
cannot rightly be done because it cannot-ever-be done right.
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Todayk decision serves as further confirmation of the
failure of our experiment with capital punishment. The
Court' early belief that it could fashion a constitutionally-
legitimate process for imposing the death penalty, [see
State v Ramseur, 524 A.2d 188, 294 (1987)] ("How we
will resolve this paradox remains as yet fully unrevealed to
us. We shall continue to labor on the process. "), has
foundered on yet another rock . ... The inconsistency,
subjectivit and moralizing evident in today's decision are
the inevitable products of a futile endeavor: the quest to
devise and to apply a standard of due-process protection
commensurate with the gravity of a death sentence .... I
think it ... evident that the Court must either reject its
effort to carry out capital punishment or accommodate
itself to the juridical brutality of imposing death without
due-process protections commensurate to its awesome
finality.
We are constrained in capital cases to concentrate
unremittant attention and expend enormous public
resources on persons who deserve no sympathy whatsoever
Sympathy has nothing to do with our judicial duty; our
common humanity, however, has everything to do with it.
If we allow death to be imposed without the full measure
of constitutional protection and defend endlessly the
legitimacy of what we do, we invite only disrespect for the
law340
340 State v. Martini, 651 A.2d 949, 1001 (N.J. 1994) (Handler, J., dissenting)
(citation omitted), cert. denied, No. 95-5073, 1995 WL 411745 (U.S. Oct. 2,
1995).
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